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B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1978; J.D., University of Wisconsin. 1983; Di-
rector of the Freedom of Information Clearinghouse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Societies need vigorous criticism and challenges to their preconcep-
tions to improve governmental decision-making. Public discussion and
dissent are particularly essential during national crises, such as military
engagements or attempted expansions of governmental powers. Ironi-
cally, when public scrutiny is most needed, governments impede the pub-
lic's access to information and the public right to criticize governmental
activities.2
Throughout Anglo-American history, those in government have
sought to silence their opposition. Depending on the period, govern-
ments have utilized different means of limiting criticism. When auto-
cratic principles have predominated, governments have punished
criticism directly. As democratic principles overshadowed autocratic
political philosophies, direct suppression of public criticism became in-
1. "[The freedom of speech is aprincipal pillar in a free Government: when this support
is taken away the Constitution is dissolved and tyranny is erected on its ruins. Republics and
limited monarchies derive their strength and vigor from apopular examination into the actions
of the Magistrates." Letter to the author of the Pennsylvania Gazette (Nov. 17-Dec. 8, 1737),
reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 62 (L. Levy ed. 1966).
2. In his book Rights on Trial, Arthur Kinoy highlights the role of governmental sup-
pression of political dissent during the 1950's. According to Kinoy, the United States govern-
ment used extreme measures to suppress all political opposition to escalation of the Cold War.
A. KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 80-87, 92, 96, 117-18 (1983).
To avoid vigorous opposition to the bombing of Cambodia and United States intervention
in the Angolan civil war, the United States executive conducted these military operations in
secret. M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, Top SECREr: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT
TO KNOW 1, 14-24 (1977). It is beyond question that the escalation of the Cold War and
United States military intervention in the Third World have had enormous effects on the state
of world affairs and that extensive public debate should have taken place before the fact.
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consistent with contemporary political theory. Accordingly, democratic
governments have used more indirect methods to control opposition,
such as limiting access to governmental information.
A key element of a democratic system of government is public par-
ticipation. To participate in democratic self-government, the people need
to be informed about the government's activities. Therefore, as Anglo-
American governmental systems have become more democratic, the pub-
lic right of access to governmental information has been expanded. As
the public has gained greater access to information, however, English
and United States governments have sought to protect certain govern-
mental functions from public scrutiny. Accordingly, the law of both
countries recognizes exceptions to public access designed to protect such
areas as national defense and foreign affairs. Although some legitimate
grounds exist for withholding governmental information, they are subject
to abuse. Governmental leaders can expand and misuse legitimate
grounds to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing or negative informa-
tion, thus erecting a cloak of secrecy to lessen opposition to their actions.
In one striking respect, the English and United States systems differ
in their limitations on public access. In England, public access can be
limited to protect the operation of the judicial process. By limiting pub-
lic access to information in the guise of protecting the judicial function,
the English government can remove judicial actions from public scrutiny.
No such limitation is recognized in the United States.
Restrictions on public access to governmental information lessen the
effectiveness of public participation, for without such information, the
populace cannot formulate informed opinions about governmental ac-
tions. This flaw in democratic self-government is especially destructive
when the government restricts public access unjustifiably, for example, to
limit the formation or effectiveness of opposition to the current govern-
ment. If the public is left uninformed, it is deprived of the means with
which to compel the government to consider alternatives and to account
for sensitive and far-reaching decisions.
II. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL THEORY ON
SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT
The locus of sovereignty, as ascribed by Anglo-American political
theories, determines the extent of permissible public criticism of govern-
ment. When the ruler was regarded as a superior being and as the right-
ful arbiter of the people, it was manifestly wrong to reprove or censure
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the ruler openly.3 As the ruler came to be viewed as an agent or servant
to whom the people delegated certain sovereign powers, it became the
duty of every member of the public, at least in theory, to censure the
ruler.4 Accordingly, restrictions on criticism of the government were
relaxed.
A. Monarchical and Parliamentary Sovereignty-Direct Suppression
of Criticism in England
The growth of the nation-state, with its emphasis on centralized au-
thority and order, was based on the political tenet that every state must
have an indissoluble supreme power from which all governmental au-
thority emanates.5 In the early nation-states, this absolute sovereignty
vested in the King.6 Corresponding legal doctrines defined criticism of
the King as treason.7 For example, in England under the Statute of Trea-
son of 1315, the treasonous crime of imagining the King's death was
punished by hanging, disembowelling, or quartering.8
The seventeenth century English experience with an autocratic
monarchy led to the English Civil War and the English Revolution,
which partially shifted the locus of sovereignty from the King to Parlia-
ment. The Petition of Right, forced on Charles I by the Parliament of
3. F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, at 9-10 (1952). For a
discussion of the relationship between relative freedom of the press and different forms of
government, see generally W. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRIN-
CIPLE 8-15 (1947).
4. J. STEPHENS, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 299-300 (1952).
"Other liberties are held under governments, but liberty of opinion keeps governments them-
selves in due subjection to their duties." Erskine, In Defense of Thomas Paine, II LORD ER-
SKINE'S SPEECHES 139-40 (. Ridgeway 2d ed. 1813), in E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN AMERICA 21 (1963).
5. 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 48 (1755), reprinted in E. HUDON, supra note 4;
accord Leonard, The Tory View: Address to the Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay (Jan. 9, 1775), in GREAT AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKERS 97 (B. Brown ed. 1983).
6. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 18-19, 345-
47 (1969). The Salisbury Oath of 1066, declaring national homage to William, confirmed that
sovereignty vests in the monarchy. E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 20.
7. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 98-102 (1984). In Algernon Sidney's Case, 9 How. State Trials 818 (K.B.
1683), the court ruled that an unpublished writing alleging that the King was subject to Parlia-
ment and that kings could be deposed constituted constructive treason because to argue that a
king could be deposed might lead to his death. In Rex v. Twyn, 84 Eng. Rep. I064 (K.B.
1663), Twyn was convicted and executed for printing a book that contended the King should
be accountable to his subjects. Accord Peacham's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 711 (KB. 1629).
8. E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 21; see also R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 166 (1957). For an overview of English history relating
to freedom of the press, see generally F. SIEBERT, supra note 3.
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1628,1 and the Bill of Rights, to which William and Mary agreed at the
end of the English Revolution in 1688,10 established parliamentary
supremacy.11 According to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
Parliament can pass any law, no matter how absurd or unfair, and the
English judiciary cannot declare it illegal on its merits. 2 Judicial review
in England is limited to an analysis of legislative procedure. Moreover,
because each Parliament is supreme, a Parliament cannot bind its succes-
sors and each can undo the acts of previous Parliaments.13
In eighteenth century England, which was governed by a hereditary
monarchy and a legislature with hereditary underpinnings, the individu-
als and entities exercising sovereign powers were considered to be infalli-
ble and omnipotent. Under English common law, any criticism of the
sovereign rulers, public officers, or the laws and institutions of the coun-
try was suppressed as seditious libel."' The theory underlying the legal
doctrines limiting criticism of the government was that such criticism
might breed disrespect for the government, thus weakening its
authority. 15
9. The Petition of Right, reprinted in 1 THIE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY 19-21 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971).
10. Bill of Rights of 1689, reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY, supra note 9, at 41-46.
11. E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 20. A surmise of parliamentary sovereignty contempora-
neous with its establishment can be found in the words of Sir Edward Coke: "of the power and
jurisdiction of the Parliament,. . . it is so transcendant and absolute, as it cannot be confined
either for causes or persons within any bounds." E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF TIlE INSTI-
TUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 36 (1644); accord 1 W. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
49, 162 (1765), reprinted in E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 20. For a criticism of Blackstone's
views on sovereignty in the English system, see E. BARKER, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 129-30,
144, 151 (2d ed. 1951).
12. T. ERSKINE MAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND US-
AGES OF PARLIAMENT 29 (18th ed. 1971).
The Constitution has assigned no limits to the authority of Parliament over all mat-
ters and persons within its jurisdiction. A law may be unjust and contrary to sound
principles of government; but Parliament is not controlled in its discretion, and when
it errs, its errors can only be corrected by itself.
See also B. GUPTA, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF Six LIVING CONSTITUTIONS 33-34 (1974).
13. S. A. DE SMITH, FOUNDATIONS OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 73-74, 79-82 (H. Street & R. Brazier eds. 4th ed. 1981).
De facto limitations on parliamentary sovereignty may now exist in the form of public
opinion, executive power, and the party machine. B. JONES, BRITISH GOVERNMENT TODAY
210-11 (1972); E. BARKER, supra note 11, at 71.
14. E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 21; R. POUND, supra note 8, at 166.
15. See De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606) (the tribunal consid-
ered a libel against governmental officials more grievous than a libel against private citizens);
Tuchin's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B. 1704).
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B. American Colonial Rejection of Parliamentary Sovereignty in
Favor of Public Participation in Government
Initially, the American colonists espoused English concepts of abso-
lute parliamentary sovereignty.16 The American settlers were concerned
with their rights under the "English Constitution," a term used to desig-
nate the Magna Carta, the Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689, and
principles embodied in oral conventions. 17
When the English sought to tax the colonists and to tighten trade
regulations, colonial theorists began to challenge the English Constitu-
tion. Arguing that Parliament had exceeded its authority, the colonists
drew on their own experience with royal proprietary charters as an un-
derlying contract between people and government and on the theory of
inalienable natural rights inuring to the people before the creation of gov-
ernment. From the limits on colonial self-governance imposed by royal
charters and colonial status, the colonists came to accept the concept of
external limitations on governmental sovereignty.'3 Similarly, the colo-
nists argued that natural law limited parliamentary sovereignty and that
any parliamentary act contrary to natural law was void.' 9
In light of their rejection of parliamentary authority, the colonists
had to restructure the nature of legislative authority and representa-
tion.2° Eventually, prominent American theorists resolved their quest for
an appropriate relationship between people and government by transfer-
16. The heart of the political debate between England and the American colonies centered
on the doctrine of sovereignty. Both sides relied on the English Constitution with opposing
emphases on parliamentary sovereignty and the requisite consent and representation of the
governed. G. WOOD, supra note 6, at 15-17, 344-89.
17. See Dickinson, Letters From a Farmer (1767-1768) Letter II, in 1 GREAT AMERICAN
POLITICAL THINKERS 80-90 (B. Brown ed. 1983); L. LEDER, LIBERTY AND AUTHoRrrY:
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1689-1763, at 85-94 (1968); J. WILSON, CONSIDER-
ATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PAR-
LIAMENT (1774).
The English Constitution, which is primarily an unwritten set of customary rules evolved
over time, contains few guarantees of individual freedoms. A person possesses liberties only if
the exercise of these freedoms does not infringe on other laws. H. STREET, FREEDOM, THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 12-13 (5th ed. 1982).
18. See 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 49-52, 53-
170.
19. See Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), in 1 GREAT
AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKERS 75-80 (B. Brown ed. 1983); 3. WILSON, supra note 17, at 90-
96; Adams, Submission is Slavery, Address to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts
Bay (Jan. 30, 1775), in 1 GREAT AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKER 107-08 (B. Brown ed.
1983); Adams, Novanglus (1775), in 1 GREAT AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKERS 108-18 (B.
Brown ed. 1983).
20. G. WOOD, supra note 6, at 354-63. See also W. HOCKING, supra note 3, at 8-15.
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ring sovereignty from the legislature to the people.21 In the words of
Thomas Jefferson, "I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers
of the society but the people themselves."22 Accordingly, legislative bod-
ies came to be viewed as trustees of the people, accountable to the public
will. 23
The theory of a sovereign public prescribed a profoundly heightened
role for the general populace in governmental affairs, one that included
vigorous debate and criticism of governmental actions.24 Free discussion
of public measures and political opinions was viewed as essential for an
informed populace to exercise its sovereign powers.25 For example,
James Madison opined: "A popular Government, without popular infor-
mation or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or perhaps both . . . .A people who mean to be their own
Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives."'26 Thus the press theoretically plays an important role in United
States self-government by gathering and presenting to the public infor-
mation about governmental actions. In essence, the press oversees the
operation of democratic institutions.27
21. G. WOOD, supra note 6, at 18, 363, 371-75.
22. T. JEFFERSON, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDIES, REP. No. 10,
BILL OF RIGHTS (1971), reprinted in Comment, The Public's Right of Access to Government
Information Under the First Amendment, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 164, 176 (1974-75).
23. G. WOOD, supra note 6, at 371.
24. The early American emphasis on public participation in government has been attrib-
uted to the colonists' experiences in local self-government, the lack of feudal hierarchies and
social rigidities in America, and the extensive discussions of political liberty that occurred
throughout the colonial period. L. LEDER, supra note 17, at 19-27. See J. LOFTON, THE
PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1980).
During the colonial period and the first decades of the new republic, the press assumed a
formidable position as critic of government. NEWSLETrERS TO NEWSPAPERS: EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY JOURNALISM 237, 247, 303 (1977); Jensen, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456,
457 (1961). The colonists grew interested in freedom of speech and freedom of the press be-
cause lawyers' pamphlets, which argued against the Stamp Act, attacked the disallowance of
colonial statutes by the Privy Council, and opposed the royal governor's arbitrary conduct,
were considered seditious by the royal governors. R. POUND, supra note 8, at 66-67.
25. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1941); T. JEFFERSON, in
Comment, supra note 22, at 176; Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec of 1974, 1 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 105-13 (1774-1789), reprinted in I THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 221, 223 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971). See also McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187-89 (1959).
26. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910), reprinted in United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252,
1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978).
27. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Tite press
has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to
set newsmen as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know"); R.
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C. Direct Suppression of Criticism Diminishes as Democratic
Principles Predominate
Although Anglo-American political theories have placed sover-
eignty in the people or in a governmental branch, clear delineations of
the locus of sovereignty have given way to murkier realities. The United
States government has attained a position of power and entrenchment
that is inconsistent with a truly sovereign public. During periodic waves
of repression in United States history, the government has shielded itself
from criticism by punishing seditious libel.2" The methods of limiting op-
position, however, have generally shifted from punishing criticism di-
rectly to limiting public access to information.
At the same time, the English system has become less autocratic and
more responsive to the popular will. Through the evolution of political
theory and the practical operation of the English political system, Parlia-
ment has arguably become the repository of the nation's sovereignty and
a trustee of the people, much like the United States Congress. 9 As a
corollary, doctrines that limit public criticism of government in England
have been greatly modified. Public discussion and public access to infor-
mation have expanded as England has progressed from a relatively abso-
lute monarchy to a more limited one, and then to a still more democratic
system.30 The evolution of seditious libel and certain contempt of court
LISTON, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 9-10 (1973). Accord Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88-90 (1966) (Douglas, L, concurring). See also A. MEIKLFoHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment isan Absolut 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245, 256-57. Butsee IV. BERNS, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153-54 (1970).
28. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 brought about a revival in the United States of
seditious libel prosecutions under earlier English law. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 25, at 27-28. See
generally J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951); .
SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LlB-
ERTIES (1956). In both England and the United States, sedition offenses were resurrected to
silence opposition to World War I. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
29. It is commonly inferred that the House of Commons derives its authority from the
people. P. BROMHEAD, BRITAIN'S DEVELOPING CONSTITUTION 167 (1974); see also G.
WOOD, supra note 6, at 346-48. Currently, there is a movement in England for the enactment
of a bill of rights to protect civil liberties through written guarantees enforceable through judi-
cial review. Such a bill would further limit parliamentary sovereignty. See generally Do WE
NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? (C. Campbell ed. 1980); J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS (1980).
30. F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 9-13. The Tudor-Stuart autocratic monarchies controlled
the press through licensing, which effectively amounted to censorship. E. HUDON, supra note
4, at 9-10. During the eighteenth century, at a time when an arbitrary monarchy was no
longer tenable, William Blackstone and Lord Mansfield propounded a theory of liberty of the
press. F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 380-92. Although this new liberty freed the press from
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powers illustrates the decreasing prominence of direct suppression of
criticism in democratic systems.
1. The Decline of Seditious Libel
Throughout the evolution of Anglo-American seditious libel law,
the amenability of the government to criticism has fluctuated in ways
that reflect theories of sovereignty.3 I Because the theory of seditious libel
is inconsistent with the democratic political traditions of England and
the United States, its use as a means of suppressing opposition has been
sharply limited in both countries. In particular, the role of a sovereign
public in a democratic system has led to the erosion of the doctrine of
seditious libel.
a. The Doctrine of Seditious Libel Under English Common Law
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a decision of the Star
Chamber established seditious libel as a criminal offense.32 After aboli-
tion of the Star Chamber, the English courts adopted this offense predi-
cated on the precept that any written reflection on the government was
seditious.3 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a prestigious ju-
rist established an all-inclusive rationale for the law of seditious libel:
If men should not be called to account for possessing the people with
an ill opinion of the Government, no Government can subsist; for it is
very necessary for every Government, that the people should have a
good opinion of it. And nothing can be worse to any Government than
to endeavour to procure animosities as to the management of it.
34
If a publication had a tendency to incite the people to change the
licensing, the common law and legislative acts filled the void by creating and imposing other
lesser restraints on the press. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
31. See J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 299-300. See also J. Madison, Report Accompanying
the Virginia Resolution, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 547, 570-73 (J. Elliot ed. 1836 reprinted
1941). For a discussion of the evolution and eventual demise of press censorship through
licensing, see Goodhart, Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 248,
259-62.
32. De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606); see 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 336 (1926).
33. Mayton, supra note 7, at 106-07; F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 271. H. SCHOFIELD,
Freedom of the Press in the United States (1914), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS PROM
HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 48-49 (H. Nelson ed. 1967). The English common law
definition of seditious libel encompassed those publications that tended to create and diffuse
among the people ill opinions of public officers, governmental institutions and laws,
34. Tuchin's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 1133-34 (K.B. 1704) (Holt, C.J.). Tuchin was convicted
of sedition for publishing papers stating that certain army and navy officers were corrupt.
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existing order, its author or printer could be punished for seditious li-
bel.35 Under the English common law, truth was not a defense to a libel
charge because criticism that reflected the truth was believed to have an
even more damaging effect on public confidence in the government than
false criticism.3
6
Because seditious libel law was a creature of the Star Chamber, the
common-law procedures that governed grand jury indictments and trial
by jury did not apply.37 After the abolition of the Star Chamber, English
judges tried to preserve unrestrained judicial authority by restricting the
application of these common-law protections in seditious libel prosecu-
tions.38 In an attempt to limit the moderating effect of a jury trial, seven-
teenth century judges adopted the position that publication of the matter,
without more, was sufficient to establish seditious intent. In addition, the
jury could decide only whether the person charged with seditious libel
had published the offending material. The judge determined whether the
material was seditious.39 Moreover, most jurists applied the standard
that any reflection on government was seditious.'
In 1792, after much public opposition to limited jury participation,
Parliament enacted the Fox Libel Act. This law declared that the jury
would determine the sedition and intent issues in libel cases, in addition
to the fact of publication.41 The English law of seditious libel was further
35. J. STEPHENS, supra note 4, at 299. It should be noted that the Criminal Libel Act of
1819 permitted a court in which a libel judgment had been obtained to confiscate copies of the
libelous material in the convicted person's possession. The 1819 Act defined seditious libel as
material tending to bring hatred or contempt on the King, the government, the constitution, or
a House of Parliament, or tending to excite people to alter any matter of church or state. 19
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 7 (3d ed. 1970). The seditious libel prosecution of John
Wilkes in England illustrates how seditious libel can be used to curtail criticism of government.
John Wilkes, a member of the House of Commons criticized governmental officials in his
newspaper and was prosecuted and convicted for seditious libel. When he was expelled from
Parliament, the House of Commons declared his seat vacant but it overturned three subse-
quent elections in which Wilkes was re-elected. After the fourth election, the first in which
Wilkes ran opposed, his opponent was declared a member of the House of Commons in spite of
his dismal showing at the polls. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 25, at 242-47.
36. See F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 269-75. As Lord Mansfield declared, "the greater the
truth the greater the libel." Reprinted in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 25, at 499-500.
37. Mayton, supra note 7, at 104-07.
38. Goodhart, supra note 31, at 254.
39. F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 273-74. In Rex v. Carr, 7 State Trials 1111, 1128 (1680),
Chief Justice Scroggs directed the jury: "[I]f you find him guilty and say what he is guilty of,
we will judge whether the thing imports malice or no." See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 32,
at 345.
40. Dean of St. Asaph's Case (Rex v. Shipley), [1784] 4 Douglas KB. 73, 170 (Lord
Mansfield); see also F. SIEBERT, supra note 3, at 380-92.
41. Fox Libel Act of 1792, 19 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 5-6 (3d ed. 1970).
One clause of the English Incitement to Disaffection Act made it a crime to possess any docu-
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liberalized in 1843, when Parliament provided that truth was a defense to
seditious libel charges.42
b. American Rejection of English Seditious Libel
Some jurists and scholars contend that one purpose of the American
Revolution was to free colonists from the English seditious libel law.4 3
Although this has been disputed, it is clear that since the trial of John
Peter Zenger in 1735, American juries have decided whether a publica-
tion was in fact seditious and whether the material was truthful, a de-
fense to seditious libel under colonial and United States law." Even the
Sedition Act of 1798, a blemish on the United States law of freedom of
the press, allowed the defendant to prove the truth of the publication in
defense to a seditious libel charge. The Act also assigned the jury the
task of determining whether the material was seditious and whether the
defendant published the material.4a
ment the dissemination of which would be a crime. After much political debate, an element of
intent was added to the offense. See H. STREET, supra note 17, at 211-13.
42. Lord Campbell's Act, ch. 96, 6 & 7 Vict. (1843), 19 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND 14 (3d ed. 1970).
In Regina v. Duffy, [1846] 2 Cox's Criminal Cases 45, 49, Chief Justice Blackburn held
that "no one could contend that libels of a blasphemous, or treasonable, or seditious nature can
come within the statute, for such can never be of public benefit." Hence, for some time, Eng-
lish courts still refused to allow truth to be pleaded in defense to seditious libel charges,
43. H. SCHOFIELD, supra note 33, at 42, 57. See also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 25, at 16-20;
Cooper, The Case for Freedom: The Social and Individual Good, reprinted in THE FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 3-16 (H. Nelson ed. 1967). But see
L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 182, 188, 190
(1960).
44. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 25, at 27. In his newspaper, Zenger had criticized the royal
governor for incompetence, favoritism, tampering with trial by jury, and rigging elections. At
trial, the judge instructed the jury that it could decide only whether Zenger in fact published
the material, leaving to the judge the determination of whether the material was seditious. The
judge further instructed that truth of the matter did not erase guilt. Contrary to the judge's
instructions, the jury found Zenger not guilty. From that point on, the colonists accepted
truth as a defense to seditious libel and assigned to the jury the task of deciding whether the
publication at issue was seditious. N. HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS
HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 63-68 (1980).
45. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, § 3, 1 Stat.
596 (July 14, 1789). R. POUND, supra note 8, at 69-71. Although commentators generally
assumed that the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were unconstitutional, it was not until 1964
that the United States Supreme Court so ruled in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
276-77 (1964). See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790 provided that truth was a defense to charges of sedi-
tious libel and that the jury decided whether material was seditious. See Penn, The People's
Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 1670, in I
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 144, 144-46, 148 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971).
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c. Restrictions on Seditious Libel in England
and the United States
Because seditious libel conflicts with the theory of democratic self-
government, its use as a means of suppressing criticism has declined in
England and the United States. Nonetheless, both countries have cur-
tailed liberties in wartime through laws which make it a crime to subvert
the military.' These laws have included some provisions that have been
used to suppress unpopular opinions. For example, the American Sedi-
tion Act of 1918 made it a crime to "utter, print, write, or publish any
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of gov-
ernment of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or
the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States" and to use "any
language intended to. . . encourage resistance to the United States or to
promote the cause of enemies."'
In interpreting these statutes, the United States Supreme Court has
adopted a standard that lessens the harshness of such sedition provisions:
"[The] question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."48 Subsequently, the Court refined this "clear and
present danger" test to require an imminent or immediate threat that the
illegal act would follow,49 and advocacy of a specific violation of the law
46. See, eg., the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797, 37 Geo. 3, ch. 70; the English Incite-
ment to Disaffection Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 56; the American Espionage Act, 40 Stat.
217 (1917); and the American Sedition Act, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (amending the Espionage Act).
For the discussion of the Incitement to Mutiny Act, see D. WiLLANS, NOT IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 102-03, 113-14 (1965). See also Unlawful Oaths Act, 1797 and 1812, 37 Geo. 3, ch.
123, 52 Geo. 3, ch. 104; Seditious Meetings Act, 1817, 57 Geo. 3, cl. 19 (mostly repealed by
the Criminal Law Act of 1967 c. 58); Tumultuous Petitioning Act, 1661, 13 Car. 2, ch. 5, § I.
47. 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
48. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See . ROCHE, THE QUEST r-OR THE
DREAM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN MODERN
AMERICA 39-47 (1963); cf . MILLS, ON LIBERTY 67 (1956).
49. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Supreme Court had previously
applied the clear and present danger test in contempt of court cases, see, eg., Craig v. Harny,
331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941), in determining the validity of state statutes, see, eg., Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), in determining the validity of local ordinances and regulations, see, eg., West Virginia
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), and in
reviewing a common law offense, see eg., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
The seeds of the imminence or immediacy requirement were sown in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, J3., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); and Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J., concurring).
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rather than of an abstract doctrine.5" Moreover, in reviewing Cold War
era convictions for advocating the overthrow of the government based
solely on the defendants' membership in the Communist Party, the Court
required intent as an element of the crime.51 Thus, statutes that punish
mere advocacy of unlawful acts are interpreted to require an imminent
danger of the result occurring, intent to accomplish that result, and in-
citement of a specific violation of the law as opposed to a general political
doctrine.52
The clear and present danger test is similar in effect to the twentieth
century English concept of seditious libel. In the late nineteenth century,
English courts began to distinguish between intent to bring about social
or political change through unlawful means and mere expression of opin-
ions critical of the government.5 3 In England, sedition now implies an
50. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Accord Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 297-98 (1961). The distinction between advocacy of violation of law and general political
agitation was first developed by Judge Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244
F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
51. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). Accord Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
52. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973) (per curiam). Current efforts in the United States to crack down on terrorism may run
afoul of these standards. Proposed criminal provisions make it a crime to threaten to use force
with the intent of influencing someone in furtherance of a political objective. It would also be
a crime to support any group labelled terrorist by the Secretary of State. These provisions
would criminalize advocacy without imminent danger of the result occurring and advocacy of
general political doctrine. Ray & Schaap, Pentagon Moves on "Terrorism", 22 COVERT Ac-
TION INFORMATION BULL. 4, 9 (Fall 1984). See also Alliance to End Repression v. City of
Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (reversing district court order enjoining
operation of FBI guidelines that authorized investigations of domestic groups and individuals
that advocate criminal activity without requiring a showing that the statements pose an imme-
diate and substantial danger).
The government recently resurrected the doctrine of seditious libel. In response to a CIA
complaint regarding an ABC broadcast, the FCC determined that governmental agencies can
file complaints contending they have been unfairly abused on the airwaves. Karp, Liberty
Under Siege: The Reagan Administration's Taste for Autocracy, HARPER'S MAC., Nov. 1985,
at 65-66.
53. Regina v. Bums, [1886] 16 Cox's Criminal Cases 355, in which the judge instructed
the jury as follows:
[I]f you trace from the whole of the matter laid before you that they have a
seditious intention to incite the people to violence, to create public disturbances and
disorder, then undoubtedly you ought to find them guilty. . . . On the other hand,
if you come to the conclusion that they were actuated by an honest desire to alleviate
the misery of the unemployed-if they had a bona fide desire to bring the misery
before the public by constitutional and legal means-you should not be too swift to
mark any hasty or ill-considered expression which they might utter in the excitement
of the moment.
In the 1970 Quebec October Crisis, precipitated by the kidnapping of James Cross, the
United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, and the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte, the
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intent to create public disorder, tumult, or insurrection.' Where an indi-
vidual uses language calculated or likely to incite others to public disor-
der, insurrection, or violence, however, illegal intent is not a necessary
element of sedition."5
In sum, as democratic principles have predominated in England and
the United States, the doctrine of seditious libel has been restricted.
Thus, in both countries, intent to bring about some illegal act is generally
required as an element of seditious libel. Under American law, this in-
tent must be coupled with a likelihood of accomplishing, or inciting
others to accomplish an unlawful act. While intent and likelihood of
result are cumulative elements of contemporary seditious libel in the
United States, they are considered alternative elements in England. For
example, in the United States, advocacy of an abstract doctrine without
propounding a specific illegal act cannot be punished as seditious libel.
Contemporary English law has not yet adopted this distinction. Despite
differences in the extent of modern restrictions, it is clear that seditious
libel as it has developed in England and the United States no longer is an
effective tool for silencing opposition.
2. Protecting Sovereignty Through the Contempt
of Court Powers
The contempt power, used by governmental bodies to punish disobe-
dience, interference, or criticism, coerces compliance with, and respect
for, the government at the expense of individual opinion.56 The purpose
and practice of the contempt power are more suited to a centralized sys-
tem of government than to a democracy. In principle, the contempt
power furthers the institutions of the monarchy and parliamentary
Quebec Labor Minister, the government proclaimed the War Measure Act which prohibited
the publication of anything threatening security or supporting the Front Liberation de Qudbec,
the organization allegedly responsible for the violence. Doern, Canada, in GovERNMENT SE-
CRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 147-48 (I. Galnoor ed. 1977).
54. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 208-09. See generally S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 13, at
480.
The modern-day English attitude toward seditious libel, which requires an intent to incite
people to violence against the laws or institutions of England, should be contrasted with the
still far-reaching approach in the English colonies. See, eg., Rex v. Wallace-Johnson, 1940
A.C. 231.
55. Rex v. Aldred, [1909] 22 Cox's Criminal Cases 1. See E. WADE & G. PHILPLM,
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 492, 494-95 (6th ed. 1980).
56. The Anglo-American law of contempt evolved from the divine law of kings. R. GOLD-
FARE, THE CONTEMPT POWER 8-13 (2d ed. 1971). Because of the divine ordination of the
monarch, any resistance to the sovereign was a sin. The law of contempt is predominantly an
Anglo-American legal tenet. See generally Goodhart, supra note 31, at 885.
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supremacy by protecting sovereign authority, while it conflicts with the
precepts of a democracy by quashing individual dissension. In a democ-
racy, it is difficult to reconcile the use of the contempt power to punish
criticism with the concept of a sovereign populace whose duty it is to,
debate governmental actions." The extent to which the contempt power
is tolerated in a legal system indicates the society's tolerance of criticism
of governmental actions.
The contempt power is particularly threatening to individual liberty
because its exercise is not constrained by common procedural protec-
tions. Historically, judges punished contempt summarily on the theory
that if the conduct took place before the judge, little remained for adjudi-
cation.5" Thus, the accused had no right to a jury trial, and the offended
judge, rather than a disinterested one, tried the matter and sentenced the
accused. 59 Moreover, rights to appeal and to counsel traditionally were
limited in contempt cases. 6° Although recent statutes establishing con-
tempt crimes are more specific, the common-law crime and its permissi-
ble sanctions are defined in vague and broad terms, thereby allowing
57. A justification for this inconsistency distinguishes between the government, which ex-
ercises sovereign power on behalf of the people, and those who disobey the sovereign will,
Disobedience ofjudicial orders is viewed as disrespectful to, and contemptuous of, the people's
sovereignty as manifested in governmental bodies, rather than as individual expressions of the
sovereign will. See Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (1858). For alternative views, see
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 5-6, 14-18, 20-22.
58. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 13-14; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 147-48. This
summary procedure began in the case of Rex v. Almon, [1765] Wilmot Notes 243 (Wilmot ed.
1802). Due to procedural complications, this opinion was never rendered. Ironically, the in-
stitution of this summary procedure was based on historical inaccuracy. Goodhart, supra note
31, at 898-99. Nevertheless, it has become the established procedure in criminal contempt
cases. See 7 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1-2 (3d ed. 1969). See, e.g., Regina v.Gray,
[1900] 2 Q.B. 36; Rex v. Clement, 106 Eng. Rep. 918, 4 Barn. & Ald. 218 (1821). This
summary procedure is still used and defended. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 343 (8th
Cir. 1984)(en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985). But see Sandstrom v,
Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200 (11th Cir. 1984)(defendant's right to an unbiased tribunal can
override judge's authority to punish contempt summarily).
59. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 147-48. See generally Green v. United States, 356 U.S,
165 (1957).
60. See Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888). A distinction has been made between
direct contempt, which may be punished summarily and indirect contempt, which is subject to
certain procedural protections by more recent statutes and judicial decisions. See generally J,
Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 61-69.
In England, a person convicted of contempt had no right of appeal prior to the passage of
the Administration of Justice Act of 1960, § 11, 7 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 718-
23 (3d ed. 1969). For this reason, the pre-1960 appellate cases on the English law of contempt
were from the Privy Council, which has jurisdiction over appeals in contempt cases from com-
monwealth territories. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 166.
[Vol, 8
Right of Public Access
unconstrained judicial discretion.6
Under Anglo-American law, the contempt power has been used to
punish statements that scandalize the court on the theory that such state-
ments lower the court's dignity and destroy public confidence in the ad-
ministration of justice.62 This limitation on public debate about judicial
actions is inconsistent with the concept of controlling judicial conduct
through pervasive public discussion and criticism.
English courts have accordingly become reluctant to use the con-
tempt power to punish criticism of judicial conduct, at least -where such
criticism pertains to an adjudicated matter.63 Instead, it is left to public
opinion to evaluate attacks derogating judicial behavior." The modem
approach to such attacks has been explained as follows: "an attack on
the man is punished but criticism of his output in the shape of judicial
utterances is allowed."65 The rationale behind the relaxation of this type
of contempt is that public comment, including criticism of judicial deci-
sions, will improve the state of the law. Nonetheless, statements chal-
lenging a judge's impartiality still have been punished as contemptuous
on the theory that they undermine public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.66 For example, a newspaper editor was convicted and fined when
61. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 148; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 147-48. See, eg.,
18 U.S.C. § 3692 (Norris-LaGuardia Act); and 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (Clayton Act).
62. Regina v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36; Rex v. Editor of the "New Statesman," [1928] 44
T.L.R. 301; Rex v. Colsey, [1931] 47 L.Q. Rev. 315, discussed in H. STREET, supra note 17, at
164-65 and Goodhart, supra note 31, at 903-04.
Under English common law, contempt by newspapers can take three forms: 1) publica-
tion of comments on pending litigation that might influence jurors or judges, thereby interfer-
ing with a fair trial; 2) publication of comments scandalizing the court either by lowering the
dignity of the court or by destroying public confidence in the administration of justice; and 3)
publication of comments abusing the parties to an action, causing a party to discontinue or
compromise an action out of fear for public dislike, or otherwise deterring people from bring-
ing causes of action to the court. See Roach v. Garvan (St. James Evening Post), 26 Eng. Rep.
683-85, 2 Atkyn's 469, 471 (1742). The first and second forms of contempt, which are related
to public criticism or access to information, are discussed in section IV, infra, and in this
section, respectively.
63. Although it has been argued that English courts no longer use the contempt power to
punish comments scandalizing the courts after the case has been adjudicated, this does not
seem to be the case elsewhere in the British Commonwealth. McLeod v. St. Aubyn, 1899
A.C. 549, 561. Accord Ambard v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago, 1963 A.C. 322.
The contempt power is still used in Canada to punish scandalous publications. The Vancouver
Province: In re Rex v. Gash, 12 W.W.R. (n.s.) 349 (1964); D. SCHMEOSER, CIVIL LIBERTiES IN
CANADA 224 (1964). See infra text accompanying notes 151-77.
64. McLeod, 1899 A.C. at 561.
65. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 164. See Rex v. Editor of the "New Statesman," [1928]
44 T.L.R. 301.
66. In an unreported case, Marie Stopes, a famous birth control advocate, asserted that
the Daily Telegraph had refused to publish her advertisement because of Roman Catholic in-
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he criticized a judge for possible bias in the adjudication of a matter aris-
ing out of an Act which the judge had steered through the House of
Commons when he had served as attorney general.67
In the United States, it is also unusual for statements criticizing a
judge or the judicial process to be punished as contempts of court. In
theory, such publications must present a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice before they can be punished as contemptuous.
As the Supreme Court has stated:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions.68
Despite this admonition, however, American judges sometimes use the
contempt power to punish criticism of their judicial actions. 9
Although more recent statutory and judicial developments in both
England and the United States have limited the contempt power and sub-
jected it to some procedural protections, the contempt power may still be
used to silence criticism.70 Nonetheless, despite these sporadic digres-
fluences. After the newspaper successfully sued the doctor for libel, the New Statesman pub-
lished an article questioning whether Dr. Stopes could have obtained a fair trial under the
Catholic judge who had presided over the trial. In the contempt of court proceedings that
followed, the court concluded that the New Statesman article scandalized the court because It
impugned the judge's impartiality, thereby possibly undermining public confidence in the jus-
tice system. Rex v. Editor of the "New Statesman," [1928] 44 T.L.R. 301, 303.
67. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 164; Goodhart, supra note 31, at 903-04.
68. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (citations omitted). See generally Han.
son, The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publication, 27 CORNELL
L.Q. 165 (1942). Cf Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Court held unconstitutional a
Minnesota gag law, which empowered courts to enjoin as nuisances newspapers regularly en-
gaged in the publication of malicious, scandalous or defamatory material). See E. HUDON,
supra note 4, at 100-01.
69. An Alabama judge recently fined a woman $100 for contempt for writing a letter to a
local newspaper criticizing the judge's decision in a divorce case. Milwaukee J., Oct. 11, 1983,
at 5, col. 6. Subsequently, the state disciplinary board concluded that the judge's actions vio-
lated state canons of judicial ethics. Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 3. In another incident, a
Texas judge imposed a thirty-day jail sentence on a woman who wrote him a letter asserting
that her two sons were being railroaded in a criminal matter before the judge. Nat'l L.J., Feb.
27, 1984, at 10. In yet another case, an appellate judge suspended a lawyer's license to practice
before the court because the lawyer wrote a disrespectful letter criticizing the court's system of
reimbursing lawyers appointed to represent criminal defendants. In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334
(8th Cir. 1984) (en bane), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2874 (1985). As these examples show, despite clear
limitations on the use of the contempt power to curb public criticism, some American judges
have not internalized these restraints.
70. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 (notice and trial before disinterested judge where
charge is criticism of judge); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1963) (jury trial).
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sions, use of the contempt power to punish criticisms of the judicial pro-
cess is on the wane in England and the United States. This decline of
direct methods of silencing criticism of government in the form of sedi-
tious libel and contempt prosecutions parallels the evolution of demo-
cratic principles. Because public criticism of government officials is an
integral part of popular self-government, these methods of direct sup-
pression have been greatly limited.
II. CONSTRAINING OPPOSITION TO ANGLO-
AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES-LIMITING
PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENTAL
INFORMATION
Along with the evolution of Anglo-American democratic principles
has come an expansion of the public right of access to information about
government.7" Exceptions have developed pertaining to the internal
workings of government or to sensitive operations authorized by the gov-
ernment. In practice, those exercising governmental powers use these
permissible grounds for restricting public access to prevent the disclosure
of embarrassing or negative information.
In contemporary England and the United States, attempts to control
public opinion through the selective release of critical information have
replaced direct suppression of dissension as a means of limiting opposi-
tion.72 Although the courts in both countries have rejected an unlimited
71. For example, until 1868, a standing order of both Houses of Parliament forbade publi-
cation of parliamentary proceedings. T. ERSKIuE MAY, supra note 12, at 76. Although either
House can still prohibit publication of its debates and proceedings, this power is rarely used
except for misrepresentations, scandalous material, or premature disclosures of parliamentary
committee proceedings. Id at 76-77, 141-42; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 170-74. It is a
breach of parliamentary privilege to divulge any committee act or evidence before it is reported
to Parliament. T. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 12, at 142-43. At present, however, breaches of
this privilege are punished only when the committee proceedings have been closed. id. at 143.
Cf infra note 143, for discussion of lack of means to punish premature disclosure of closed
congressional proceedings in United States.
Similarly, other broad exclusions on attending and reporting of parliamentary and con-
gressional proceedings were removed in the eighteenth century in the United States and in the
nineteenth century in England. S. DAWsoN, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A STUDY OF THE
LEGAL DOCTRINE OF "QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE" 26, 30, 40.45, 66-69 (1924).
72. In contrast to the well-established right to express opinions critical of official policy or
conduct, the right to information about government is less firmly established. Hoffman, Con-
tempt of the United States: The Political Crime That Wasn't, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 343,
360 (1981). See generally Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 22. For example, the Reagan Administration has resurrected a
provision of the McCarran-Walter Act that allows the government to deny a visa if a consular
officer or the Attorney General has reason to believe that the foreigner vill "engage in activi-
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privilege by which the executive can prevent the disclosure through the
judicial process of whatever governmental information it chooses, the
courts have recognized the viability of this privilege in areas which affect
sensitive governmental operations. Similarly, both governments exploit
classification systems to withhold information from the public for polit-
ical reasons unrelated to national security. By retaining a monopoly on
selected governmental information, officials can limit public criticism.
A. Unrestrained Crown or Executive Privilege Gives Way to
Selective Nondisclosure
Crown or executive privilege is a judge-made doctrine exempting
from discovery records of executive agencies. It refers to the Crown's or
the Executive's power to withhold documents that a party normally
would be required to produce, either through the process of discovery or
in response to a subpoena for the production of documentary evidence.
An unrestrained executive right to withhold information from the
public is reminiscent of the political theories of omnipotent, sovereign
authority. Thus, it is not surprising that English and United States
courts have rejected blanket claims of executive privilege where they con-
flict with the public right of access to governmental information.
1. Crown Privilege
Before World War II, English courts had begun to claim an inherent
power to inspect documents over which Crown privilege had been de-
clared, and they had disallowed the claim of privilege in exceptional cir-
cumstances.73 A wartime decision of the House of Lords sharply
reversed this trend.
In Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Company,74 the House of Lords
unanimously held that relevant documents otherwise subject to discovery
in judicial proceedings could be withheld by the government when the
ties which would be prejudicial to the public interest." This provision has been used to deny
visas to foreigners with whom the current Administration disagrees, such as Hortensia Allende
(wife of Salvador Allende, former Chilean President), Farley Mowatt (Canadian author), and
Julio Espinosa (Deputy Cultural Minister of Cuba). Similarly, the Administration has sought
to have certain foreign environmental films labelled as political propaganda and to restrict
public access to these and other films. Washington Post, April 26, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
73. Robinson v. South Australia (No. 2), 1931 A.C. 704.
74. 1942 A.C. 624. In that case, descendants of the men who perished when the Thetis,
an English submarine, was sunk shortly before World War II, sued the shipbuilder for negli-
gence. The government objected, as an intervenor, to disclosure of plans and specifications of
the vessel and reports of its condition after recovery on grounds of injury to the public interest.
See infra note 196, for a comparison of discovery in England and the United States.
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public interest required nondisclosure. Under Duncan, a minister's deci-
sion was unreviewable in the English courts: if an English minister re-
fused production of a document on the ground that disclosure would be
against the public interest, the courts were required to accept the minis-
ter's assessment.75 The Lords protected a class of documents from dis-
closure under the public interest rubric because "the candour and
completeness of such communications might be prejudiced if they were
ever liable to be disclosed in subsequent litigation. ' 76 The opinion pro-
vided the following examples of the public interest ground for nondisclo-
sure: "where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to
good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of
documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public
service."
77
Allowing governmental officials to maintain the secrecy of docu-
ments for the "proper functioning of the public service" vested in the
government wide-ranging control over public information about govern-
ment. Governmental officials exercised this authority extensively by
withholding police reports of street accidents, navy reports of ship colli-
sions, medical records of military and civilian employees, and civil ser-
vant personnel files.78
Blanket claims of privilege for most classes of communication
within and between central governmental departments and between
those departments and outside groups led to widespread dissatisfaction.
As a result, courts began to craft exceptions to the Duncan rule. Some
courts reasserted a residual judicial power to review governmental claims
of Crown privilege.79 For example, the Court of Appeal began to under-
mine the government's right to claim Crown privilege by allowing courts
to inspect documents and order disclosure." Although the Court of Ap-
peal never expressly overruled governmental claims of privilege, it did
renew judicial review of such claims.
Judicial dissatisfaction with unlimited Crown privilege culminated
75. See D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 203-04, for a critical view of executive decisions
defining the public interest when it impinges on their actions. See S.A. DE SMrH, supra note
13, at 617-19.
76. Duncan, 1942 A.C. at 635.
77. Id at 642.
78. D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 196-97. See Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 Q.B. 135;
see also Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison (Soblen's Case), [1963] 2 Q.B. 243.
79. Glasgow Corp. v. Central Land Bd., 1956 Sess. Cas. 1; Whitehall v. Whitehall, 1957
Sess. Cas. 30.
80. In re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2), [1965] Ch. 1210; Merricks v. Nott-Bower,
[1965] 1 Q.B. 57; Wednesbury Corp. v. Ministry of Housing & Local Government, [1965] 1
W.L.R. 261.
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in Conway v. Rimmer.1 In Conway, the House of Lords unanimously
confirmed the existence of a residual judicial power to inspect documents
withheld under claims of Crown privilege and to determine whether the
interest in suppression outweighed the interest in disclosure. After Con-
way, routine documents generally will be disclosed. Those relating to
formation of policy or to crime investigation techniques, however, nor-
mally will be inspected by the courts but not disclosed.82 Despite this
recognition of judicial authority to review claims of Crown privilege, the
House of Lords counseled against judicial inspection of documents con-
cerned with national security, diplomatic relations, or cabinet decisions.
Thus, Conway did not impair absolute executive discretion to withhold
such documents.
The current English doctrine of Crown privilege embraces the con-
cept of "public interest immunity": governmental officials may claim the
privilege and courts will uphold such claims when the public interest
requires nondisclosure. Public interest immunity is recognized as a legit-
imate and necessary device to shield the government from political criti-
cism. 3 Courts will uphold governmental claims of Crown privilege to
prevent members of the public from obtaining information that would
lead to criticism of governmental actions:
[T]he most important reason [for the privilege] is that such disclosure
would create or fan ill-informed or ciptious public or political criti-
cism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no
government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of
the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to
criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps
with some axe to grind.8 4
81. 1968 A.C. 910. In Conway, a probationary police constable who had been prosecuted
for theft was discharged from his post shortly after criminal charges against him were dis-
missed. In his subsequent action for malicious prosecution, he sought production of the proba-
tionary reports on which the agency relied for discharging him on grounds of inefficiency and
theft. After inspecting the documents, the House of Lords overruled the minister's claim of
Crown privilege and ordered disclosure of the documents. It should be noted that in the con-
text of Crown privilege, English courts are solicitous of individual privacy rights in documents.
In Conway, Lord Reid cited with approval In re Joseph Hargreaves, Ltd., [1900] 1 Ch. 347, a
case in which the Inland Revenue objected to the production of income tax filings on Crown
privilege grounds. Lord Reid declared: "If the State insists on a man disclosing his documents
for a particular purpose, it requires a very strong case to justify that disclosure being used for
other purposes." Id. at 946.
82. S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 13, at 620.
83. Conway, 1968 A.C. at 952.
84. Id.
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The application of public interest immunity to governmental policy-mak-
ing has been arduously defended by a prominent jurist:
When ministers and high civil servants are forming important govern-
mental policy, their discussions and their memoranda are, and should
be, treated as highly confidential. No court should order the disclosure
of these confidential documents to outsiders, even in the interests of
justice, except under the most stringent safeguards against abuse. The
danger of disclosure is that critics of one political colour or another
will seize on this confidential information so as to seek changes in gov-
ernmental policy, or to condemn it. So the machinery of government
will be hampered or even thwarted.85
2. Executive Privilege
In contrast to the long-established and far-reaching English princi-
ple of Crown privilege, the United States Executive's attempts to exercise
this power met with judicial opposition from the outset. In the dispute
that led to Marbury v. Madison,86 the Secretary of State refused to supply
relevant documentation of a judicial appointment. In its decision, the
Court rejected the contention that confidentiality is an attribute of high
office, declaring instead that the claim of confidentiality applies only to
cabinet secrets.8 7 Since Marbury v. Madison, United States courts have
adhered to the principle that there is a category of privileged, confiden-
tial, executive communications, but have generally exercised the power
to review the propriety of any claim of the privilege.88
President Eisenhower resurrected the doctrine of an unrestrained
executive privilege in internal memoranda and in an executive order al-
lowing departments to have such control.8 9 Subsequently, President
Nixon asserted an executive privilege exempting him from producing
tape recordings pursuant to a subpoena in a criminal trial. He claimed
that withholding the information from the public was essential to the
functioning of the executive branch." The United States Supreme Court
85. Home Office v. Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. 349, 364 (Lord Denning), aff'd, (19821 1
All E.R. 532.
86. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
87. Id.
88. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807)(No. 14,692); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C. Va. 1807)(No. 14,693); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C. Va.
1807)(No. 14,694); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
89. See Schwartz, The United State. The Doctrine of Executie Piiilege, in GOVERN-
MENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 127-40 (I. Galnoor ed. 1977). See generally R. BERGER.,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); P. KAMATH, EXECUTIVE PRIV-
ILEGE VERSus DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILrrY (1982).
90. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See also United States v. United States
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rejected the claim of an uncontrolled presidential privilege. It limited
such a claim to military and diplomatic secrets and charged the courts,
rather than the executive, with the responsibility of determining whether
the privilege applies in a given situation. 91
United States courts may balance the need for confidentiality in gov-
ernmental decision-making against the need for evidence in a pending
trial.92 Any claim of executive privilege must identify with particularity
the material allegedly covered by the claim and set forth objections to its
disclosure.93 The courts, rather than the executive, have the right to de-
termine whether the claim of executive privilege will prevail. In theory,
the courts will scrutinize even those claims of privilege that are based on
a risk to national security, defense, or foreign policy. Executive claims in
these sensitive areas, however, are still accorded great deference.9 4 In re-
cent decisions, the Supreme Court has in fact established a standard of
judicial deference to national security interests in determining the propri-
ety of claims of privilege.95
One aspect of executive privilege extends protection to the decision-
making processes of government, much like the English public interest
immunity doctrine. This privilege, known as the governmental delibera-
tive process privilege, protects from disclosure documents that reflect ad-
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (executive claimed an inherent authority to suspend other
constitutional rights).
91. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. One commentator has asserted that a British minister may
have been successful in suppressing tapes similar to those President Nixon sought to withhold,
Rourke, The United States, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 127 (I. Galnoor ed,
1977). Even in the days of an absolute Crown privilege, however, the right to withhold docu-
ments under a claim of Crown privilege did not extend to criminal cases.
92. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-16; Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert,
denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977). The privilege, based on confidential presidential communications,
is presumptive only. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
bane); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane); Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). The
executive cannot shield its officials and employees from investigations into possible criminal
wrongdoing by proper governmental institutions. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane). Accord Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), stay granted, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
93. Dellums v. Powell, 642 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
94. See, eg., United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 419 F. Supp. 454
(D.D.C. 1976), remanded, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal from remand, 567 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1977). But see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320-21
(1972).
95. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S, 139
(1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 425, 427-
28 (7th Cir. 1984). For earlier cases establishing judicial deference to national security values,
see Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953),
see also Halpern, Never Question the President, 239 THE NATION 285 (Sept. 29, 1984).
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vice, recommendations, and opinions that arise in governmental policy-
making.96 It is designed to encourage open and frank policy-making, to
prevent disclosure of proposed policies before they are finally adopted,
and to avoid public confusion that could result from disclosure of ratio-
nales that were not the actual basis for the agencies' actions.97 Although
courts have limited the application of this privilege, it still can be used to
withhold important information from the public.98
3. Summary
In keeping with democratic notions of access to governmental infor-
mation, both English and United States courts have greatly limited the
doctrine of executive privilege by allowing the judiciary to review such
claims and to determine whether the public interest calls for nondisclo-
sure. In theory, claims of executive privilege are disallowed except when
nondisclosure is necessary to protect governmental policy-making and
sensitive governmental functions. Nonetheless, both English and United
States courts will accord great deference to executive claims of privilege
relating to national security, defense, and diplomatic relations.9 9
Courts in both countries allow the executive to withhold documents
pertaining to governmental decision-making, and thus the privilege can
be used to shield governmental actions from public criticism. In fact,
English judges have expressly shaped the public interest immunity doc-
trine for this purpose. English public interest immunity doctrine and the
United States governmental deliberative process privilege, however, al-
low governmental officials to withhold from discovery documents that
may fuel opposition to governmental actions.
96. NRLB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-52 (1975); Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-89 (1973). This principle protects agency documents
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act as well. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
97. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151; Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy,
617 F.2d 854, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
98. There are several limitations to the scope of this privilege. Only pre-decisional docu-
ments are protected by the privilege. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Any document that explains the rationale behind an agency decision or that comprises
agency working law is not covered by the privilege. See, eg., Schlefer v. United States, 702
F.2d 233, 237-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Taxation with Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue
Service, 646 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In addition, factual material cannot be withheld.
E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 89; Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d at 867.
For examples of recent attempts by the Reagan Administration to keep information from the
public through claims of executive privilege, see D. DEMAC, KEEPING AMERICA UNIN-
FORMED: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE 1980's, at 80-85 (1984).
99. See supra note 95.
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B. Overclassifying Information to Disarm the Opposition
As the public right to information about governmental actions has
increased, areas exempt from public access have been carved out. These
exemptions are based on an articulated need to protect sensitive govern-
mental functions. Both the United States and England have systems for
classifying sensitive governmental information and for preventing and
punishing disclosure to the public. Both systems protect disclosure of
information that could be injurious to national security or national de-
fense. In many respects, however, restrictions on the dissemination of
governmental information extend beyond military and national security
secrets and can be manipulated by the government to protect it from
criticism.
1. English Law
In England, the Official Secrets Act limits public access to official
secrets and other public documents to a far greater extent than anything
known in the United States. The Official Secrets Act punishes disclosure
of official documents and prohibits civil servants from publishing infor-
mation related to their employment even after termination.l10 Among its
restrictive provisions, section 2 of this Act makes it a crime to communi-
cate to unauthorized persons information obtained through governmen-
tal employment or through specific contacts with the government.1" 1
Since its inception, the Official Secrets Act has been used for matters
unrelated to national security.10 2 In addition to its far-reaching cover-
100. Official Secrets Act of 1911 as amended by Official Secrets Act of 1920 and 1939. See
S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 13, at 481-82. Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act of 1911 pros-
cribes the making of any sketch, plan, model, article or note, or other document or information
that could be useful to the enemy, the obtaining or communicating of any such documents or
information, and approaching any prohibited place as defined by the Act. Section 2 of the Act
creates a series of misdemeanor offenses for acquiring secret or confidential information. The
information need not be related to any matter of national importance. E. WADE & G. PHIL-
LIPS, supra note 55, at 505. The only defenses to section 2 offenses are lack of knowledge or
that the information was communicated against the accused person's desire. See generally P.
O'HIcGINS, CENSORSHIP IN BRITAIN 36-40 (1972). H. STREET, supra note 17, at 217-19; D.
WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 26-38, 94-115.
The Canadian Official Secrets Act has a section embodying the provisions of section 2 of
the British Act. It pertains to information, even if it is unclassified, obtained through govern-
mental positions or contracts and transferred without authorization. Doern, supra note 53, at
146.
101. Official Secrets Act, as amended, § 2.
102. See P. O'HIGGINS, supra note 100, at 39-40; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 220-22; D.
WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 15-21, 32-38. For example, the Act has been invoked to prevent
the publication of the wills of famous people, information that might threaten trade competi-
tion, and a hangman's memoirs. D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 94-95; H. STREET, supra
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age, the Act is excessively harsh in its application. Although in a recent
case, a judge, unsympathetic to section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, di-
rected the jury that the prosecution had to prove criminal intent,' °3
many prosecutions have succeeded without proving such intent. '3 '
The most recent prosecution under the Official Secrets Act illus-
trates its use for political reasons and the popular dissatisfaction with its
impact on access to information. The case arose when Clive Ponting, a
senior civilian official from the Ministry of Defense, sent a member of
Parliament documents dealing with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser
Belgrano during the Falklands War.' s0 The documents showed that the
facts surrounding the torpedoing of the cruiser differed from the informa-
tion previously given publicly by the Prime Minister to Parliament. 106
One of the documents was unclassified, and while the second bore a con-
fidential classification, the prosecutor conceded that its disclosure did not
actually damage national security.'07 Nonetheless, the government prose-
note 17, at 220. It has been said that embarrassment and security are the samejustification for
withholding information. Under this theory, disclosure of embarrassing information is not in
the public interest because it would disturb trust within government. Sampson, Secrecy, News
Management and the British Press, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 218, 222-23 (r. Frank
& E. Weisband eds. 1974).
103. In the Sunday Telegraph case, ajournalist was prosecuted under section 2 for commu-
nicating to unauthorized persons a British diplomat's report on the Nigerian Civil War, after
the secretary of the "D" Notices Committee had assured him the report did not compromise
national security. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, [1979] 12 E.C.H.t. 245 (European
Court of Human Rights). The judge deciding the case admonished:
This case, if it does nothing more, may alert those who govern us at least to consider,
if they have the time, whether or not Section 2 of this Act has reached retirement age
and should be pensioned off, being replaced by a section that will enable men like the
defendants and other editors to determine without any great difficulty whether a
communication by any one of them or a certain piece of information originating from
an official source, and not concerned in the slightest with national security, is going
to put them in peril of being enclosed in a dock and facing a criminal charge.
Reprinted in P. O'HIGGINS, supra note 100, at 38. See also S.A. DE S.MITH, supra note 13, at
482 n. 57
104. S.A. DE SMrrH, supra note 13, at 482-83. Recently, a committee made detailed pro-
posals for amending section 2 to limit the criminal offenses to disclosures of certain classes of
information. Under the proposal, mere receipt of information would no longer be an offense
unless the recipient was a journalist who had reason to believe the information was conveyed
in violation of the Act. The executive branch would have the exclusive responsibility for devel-
oping classification categories and for classifying information. Under the proposed reforms,
however, it still would not be a defense that disclosure of the information did not in fact injure
the public interest or that the information should not have been classified. Report of the
Franks Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act of 1911 (Cmnd. 5104 1972).
105. Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1985, at A16, col 1. For background of the case, see gener-
ally R. NORTON-TAYLOR, THE PONTING AFFAIR (1985); C. PONTING, THE RIGHT ro
KNOW: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE BEGRANO AFFAIR (1985).
106. Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1985, at A14, col. 1, 3.
107. Washington Post, supra note 105.
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cuted Ponting for leaking sensitive documents to an unauthorized per-
son. Despite the judge's pro-conviction instructions, the jury acquitted
Ponting. 108 By invoking the Official Secrets Act, the government sought
to punish the dissemination of politically embarrassing information, even
though it did not damage national security. The jury by its acquittal,
apparently refused to sanction this use of the Official Secrets Act to sup-
press information.
If the Official Secrets Act were enforced to its fullest extent, the
press would be prosecuted continually for publishing matters unrelated
to national security. Through unofficial arrangements, however, the
English government identifies the material that may be published with-
out risk of prosecution. 0 9 By means of a system of notices, known as
Defense or "D" Notices, the government identifies the material that is
deemed to be secret, the publication of which will be prosecuted. 110 In
some instances, the government has issued "D" Notices to prevent public
discussion of controversial issues rather than to protect security. 11
English law imposes additional limitations on public access to gov-
ernmental documents by means of the Thirty-Year Rule, the principle of
108. The Official Secrets Act forbids communication of information when it is against the
interests of the state. The judge instructed the jury that the interests of the state are the same
as those of the government in power at the time. The judge also instructed the jury that the
government did not want Ponting to make the information available. Washington Post, supra
note 106.
In contrast to Ponting's acquittal, another recent Official Secrets Act prosecution con-
firmed the vitality of the Act. In March 1984, Sarah Tisdall was convicted and sentenced to
six months in prison under section 2 of the Act. She had leaked a document which set out how
the government could manipulate public opinion concerning deployment of cruise missiles in
the face of anti-cruise demonstrations and negative opinion polls. J. COOK, THE PRICE OF
FREEDOM 144-48 (1985).
109. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 224.
110. Id. at 225-28. See D. Williams, supra note 46, at 80-87. For a discussion of the perva-
sive acceptance of the "D" Notice System, see Sampson, supra note 102, at 215.
111. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 227-28. A "D" Notice in 1956 forbade publications
about a supersonic bomber project. Nonetheless, some newspapers published information crit-
icizing the project. As a result of the adverse publicity the government ultimately abandoned
the project without prosecuting the newspapers. See D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 84-87.
The result of "D" notice prohibition of publication is that English citizens can learn about
their government's actions from foreign newspapers, or not at all. For example, English citi-
zens could not learn from English newspapers the contents of propaganda dropped in Ger-
many, but could learn the contents from United States newspapers. H. STREET, supra note 17,
at 226.
The Official Secrets Act applies to a wide range of documents, such as those pertaining to
nuclear power plant safety, see J. COOK, supra note 108, at 90-105, and British Rail plans to
discontinue certain lines of service, id. at 11. In 1984, the government prevented timely public
discussion of a proposal to transfer youth training responsibilities from local authorities to a
centralized commission by prolonging disclosure of the plan for six months. Id. at 12.
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collective cabinet responsibility, and clearance requirements. Under the
Thirty-Year Rule, cabinet records and departmental documents are
transferred to the Public Records Office and made unavailable to the
public until thirty years after their creation."' The Lord Chancellor has
the authority to shorten or lengthen the thirty-year period at the request
of the minister involved.113 The inherent delays in gaining access to gov-
ernmental information under the Thirty-Year Rule impede public scru-
tiny of governmental actions.
The principle of collective cabinet responsibility, which requires
ministers to present a unified front in the name of the government, cur-
tails ministerial criticisms of governmental actions. 14 In accordance with
this principle, the majority government has forced ministers to resign for
publishing criticisms of governmental policy.115
As a corollary to this tenet, every cabinet minister is obliged to
maintain the secrecy of all cabinet proceedings absent permission of the
prime minister to do otherwise. 1 6 Sworn secrecy derives from an oath all
cabinet ministers are required to take. 7 All books written by ministers
112. See H. STREET, supra note 17, at 235-36; D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 48-49, 65-
68. Public Records Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 51, Public Records Act of 1967, 15 & 16
Eliz. 2, ch. 44. The rationale behind the Thirty-Year Rule is based in part on the desire to
encourage frankness in discussions on the part of civil servants and policy makers.
113. S.A. DE SMrrI, supra note 13, at 477-78. Prior to the 1958 enactment of the Fifty-
Year Rule, the predecessor of the Thirty-Year Rule, documents generated before 1794 were
unavailable under the previous nondisclosure rule. D. WnLLiAMS, supra note 46, at 48-49, 65-
68. The Lord Chancellor may lengthen the thirty-year period if disclosure might cause per-
sonal distress, breach of confidences or trade secrets, or endanger national security. Seymour-
Ure, England, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACiES 162-63 (1. Ganoor ed. 1977).
The Fourteen-Day Rule, which was abolished in 1955, prohibited discussion on broadcast
media of any subject due to be debated in Parliament within 14 days. Id at 172.
114. Seymour-Ure, supra note 113, at 158. This doctrine arose during the eighteenth cen-
tury to protect individual ministers from the King by presenting a united front. It then served
as a protection against the opposition in Parliament in that the entire government would have
to be displaced for one minister's actions.
115. See Seymour-Ure, supra note 113, at 158. The principle of collective cabinet responsi-
bility arose as a tenet supporting the operation of a two-party system. Walker, Secrecy and
Openess in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A British Cabinet Perspective, in SECRECY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 46-47 (r. Frank & E. Weisband eds. 1974).
116. See D. WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 43-48. Theoretically, permission to disclose infor-
mation about cabinet proceedings comes from the Queen. In practice, however, the prime
minister advises the Queen as to whether such permission should be granted. For an overview
of how cabinet secrecy works, see Walker, supra note 115, at 42-50. For a discussion of the
effect of cabinet secrecy on the relative accessibility of governmental officials to the press, see
Barber, America You Have Lovely, Helpful, Open Bureaucrats, Washington Post, Oct. 20,
1985, at Cl, cols. 4-5, and at C4, cols. 1-2.
117. Cabinet members are made Privy Councillors, and as such are required to swear an
ancient oath to keep the Queen's counsel secret. The disclosure of any information obtained as
a cabinet member would violate this oath. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 232-35.
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that relate to military and security matters must be submitted to the gov-
ernment for clearance.' 18 Without governmental approval, which is not
subject to due process protections, prosecution under the Official Secrets
Act generally will follow publication.' 19
The Official Secrets Act is the most restrictive Anglo-American stat-
ute governing public access to information. It not only gives government
extensive control over the dissemination of information, but it also pro-
vides criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of information.
2. United States Law
The United States also maintains an extensive classification system
and places restrictions on government employees who have access to con-
fidential information. The executive branch has broad discretion in clas-
sifying information, which it often uses to withhold from the public
information unrelated to national security. Until recently, however,
United States law, unlike English law, generally had not been construed
to impose criminal penalties for violations of classification restrictions
that fell short of espionage.1 20 There has now been an unprecedented
conviction of a civilian Navy official who disclosed classified information
to the press, despite evidence that no damage to national security oc-
curred.12 ' With this conviction and dangerous precedent, the United
118. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 232-35. This pre-publication clearance is not limited to
former government employees.
119. Id. The clearance decision is made by civil servants according to unpublicized guide-
lines. The author is provided no opportunity to be heard before the decision-makers and is not
informed of the reasons for refusing an application.
120. Until the Pentagon Papers prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg, the pertinent espionage
laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794, were believed to apply only to spies who sought to pass informa-
tion to foreign governments to injure the United States or to aid the foreign government, M,
HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 107-11, 115-16. Because the indictment of Daniel
Ellsberg for unauthorized possession and disclosure of the Pentagon Papers was dismissed for
governmental misconduct, the purview of the espionage statutes was not resolved. Id. at 107-
11. But see id. at 117-23 for the judge's preliminary views.
The issue arose again when Samuel Loring Morison was indicted for releasing copies of
three photographs of a Soviet submarine to Jane's Defense Weekly. See infra note 121.
121. Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1985, at Al. Morison moved to dismiss the indictment on
several grounds. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held that the espionage statute
applies to leaks as well as to classic espionage because "the danger to the United States is just
as great when this information is released to the press as when it is released to an agent of a
foreign government." United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D. Md. 1985). The
leaked information need not be properly classified, but rather need only be related to the na-
tional defense. Id. at 658-59. Moreover, according to this opinion, intent to injure the national
defense is not a necessary element of the offense. Id. at 659. Applying the espionage statutes
to the unauthorized disclosure or possession of governmental information in this manner ap-
proximates the pervasiveness of the Official Secrets Act. See also 5 U.S.C. § 8312 (1976) (with-
draws retirement benefits from persons convicted of violating espionage statutes); Exec. Order
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States classification system has attained the coercive power of the English
Official Secrets Act.
In the United States, the classification system is the primary tool for
preventing public access to governmental information.'1 It allows the
executive to prevent access if disclosure might be harmful to national
defense or foreign policy."2 By promulgating an executive order, the
President establishes criteria for determining what material should be
classified.12 4 An administration can expand the categories of material
subject to classification by changing the factors to be considered in the
classification process. For example, an administration solicitous of se-
crecy might not require that potential harm to national security be iden-
tifiable or that the public right to know be considered in classifying
information. 2 ' Similarly, executive orders may establish presumptions in
favor of the lowest or highest level of secrecy that may be applicable to
any given information. 126
No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), Note following 50 U.S.C. § 401 (provides administrative
sanctions, including discharge, for employees who publish classified information).
The Reagan Administration has threatened to prosecute individuals under the espionage
statutes for presenting research on such topics as arms control verification and the downing of
the Korean Air Lines jet. Karp, supra note 52, at 53, 64.
122. See Exec. Order No. 10,501 (1953), 3 CF.R. 979 (1949-53 compilation), as amended
by Exec. Orders of May 7, 1959; Jan. 9, 1961; Sept. 20, 1961; Jan. 12, 1962. See also Exec.
Order 11,652, 3 CF.R. 375 (1973).
123. Two governmental interests for classifying information are recognized by statute: na-
tional defense and foreign policy. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)(A) (1983).
124. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-426 (1983). The current executive order defines the security classifi-
cation grades from highest to lowest as follows: 1) "Top Secret" classification applies to mate-
rial, the unauthorized disclosure of which "reasonably could be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to national security"; 2) "Secret" applies to material, the unau-
thorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage; and 3)
"confidential" applies to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could
be expected to cause damage. Under this executive order, doubts are resolved in favor of
classification at the highest level. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982). Classification
of information under this order has resulted in more government secrecy. See D. DE.MAc,
supra note 98, at 13-18; Administration Keeping More Facts Secret, Washington Post, May 8,
1985, at A21, col. 3.
125. See Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 22. In an executive order issued in 1978, President Carter set limits on the type
and amount of information subject to classification by requiring governmental officials to con-
sider the public's right to know in classifying information and by confining classification to
documents that could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable harm to national security.
Moreover, the material had to be classified at the lowest level of clearance. Exee. Order No.
12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979). In an executive order signed on April 2, 1982, President Reagan
reversed these reforms. Governmental officials classifying information no longer need identify
the harm to national security or consider the public's right to know. In addition, when in
doubt, officials are to classify information at the highest level of secrecy. Exec. Order No.
12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982). See also D. DFMAc, supra note 98, at 13-18.
126. See supra note 125.
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Overclassifying information, that is, classifying information for rea-
sons other than national security, such as politics or job security, is pos-
sible and prevalent in the current scheme. 127 The classification system
may be used to hide errors in judgment or politically sensitive informa-
tion. 128 There are certain checks, however, on the ability to overclassify
information, the foremost of which is the Freedom of Information Act.
The Freedom of Information Act 129 affords a legally enforceable
right of access to governmental documents and files, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these exceptions correspond to established limita-
tions on the public right of access, such as those pertaining to classified
information and the governmental deliberative process privilege. 130 Even
with these restrictions, the legally enforceable right embodied in the
Freedom of Information Act is more extensive and protective of the pub-
lic right of access than anything in English law. It has broadened public
access to governmental information and has brought before the courts
the question of the propriety of withholding information from the
public.'13
The Freedom of Information Act instructs courts not to defer to the
classification system when determining whether the government could
127. See, eg., Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1983, at A4, cols. 1-3 (report criticizing medical
care of Marines in 1983 Beirut bombing was classified because it would embarrass the Penta-
gon, not because it would breach national security); see generally Franck & Eisen, Balancing
National Security and Free Speech, 14 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 339 (1982); compare B.
COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 264-79 (1963) with Sylvester, The Right, Indeed
the Duty, to Lie, Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 18, 1967, reprinted in THE PENTAGON PAPERS
AND THE COURTS 70-71 (M. Shapiro ed. 1972). Under the "housekeeping" statute, 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1983), government agencies can organize and maintain records in a way that impedes
public access. Lively, Government Housekeeping Authority: Bureaucratic Privileges Without a
Bureaucratic Privilege, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495 (1981).
128. For example, on the international front, the government kept its destabilization poll-
cies and other involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende from the public. See M.
HALPERIN, J. BERMAN, R. BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 19-29 (1976). On the domestic front, the FBI's sur-
veillance of Martin Luther King and its attempts to disrupt his activities for political reasons
were kept secret to "protect domestic security." Id. at 61-89; C. MORGAN, JR., ONE MAN,
ONE VOICE 174 (1979). See generally D. WISE & T. Ross, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
(1976); C. MORGAN, JR., supra, at 192-93; M. HALPERIN, J. BERMAN, R. BOROSAOE & C,
MARWICK, supra, at 5-12.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1983).
130. Id. § 552(b)(1) & (5). Other exceptions reflect privacy rights, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) or
the confidentiality of law enforcement investigations, id. § 552(b)(7). See Fenner & Koley,
Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 415 (1981).
131. See CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, FROM OFFICIAL FILES: An-
STRACTS OF DOCUMENTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1981). T. RILEY
& H. RELYEA, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TRENDS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1982),
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prohibit publication of information. 13 2 Rather, courts are to determine
independently the national security or other governmental interests at
stake, regardless of the classification status of the information. In prac-
tice, however, the courts have adopted a far more deferential approach to
governmental claims of national security than that envisioned in the
Act. 133
Traditionally, United States courts have permitted restrictions on
public access to information only when publication of the information
would implicate national security interests, but the common-law justifi-
cations for withholding information have since been expanded."M In
Near v. Minnesota13 1 the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for prior
restraints to protect the disclosure of national security information in
wartime. Near was subsequently applied in times of peace as well. The
Near rule was expanded further in Haig v. Agee13 6 where the Supreme
Court upheld the passport revocation of a former CIA agent who dis-
closed information about intelligence operations, including the names of
intelligence personnel. Relying on the Near rule, the Court held that the
government could restrict the publication of insider information detri-
mental to national security interests, military activities, or intelligence
operations. 137
For the past fifteen years, governmental officials have argued that
information must be withheld from the public to ensure that the United
States will retain its reputation, crucial in diplomatic and intelligence en-
132. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1983). See M. HALPERIN & D. HOFMiAN, supra note 2, at
105-06, for a description of the controversy surrounding this amendment to the Freedom of
Information Act.
133. See, eg., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S.
139 (1981) (Court did not determine whether information about location of nuclear weapons
was properly classified, but merely accepted government's assertion that it could neither con-
firm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a particular location) and Halperin, Never
Question the President, The Nation, Sept. 29, 1984, at 285-88. Accord CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct.
1881 (1985); see discussion, infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
134. See, eg., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). See
also infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
135. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The Court upheld prior restraints in wartime to prevent
"actual obstruction of its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops."
136. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
137. Id. at 303, 308. A recent law, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982,
makes it a crime intentionally to disclose information identifying a covert agent to any individ-
ual not authorized to receive classified information. Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (amend-
ing National Security Act of 1947) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426). To the extent this
Act applies to individuals who are not insiders subject to contractual limitations and to infor-
mation in the public domain, it arguably contravenes the First Amendment. See Note, The
Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 83 COLUM. L REv. 727 (1983).
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deavors, for preserving secrets. Until recently, the courts had rejected
this argument. 138 The Supreme Court, however, has now acknowledged
a governmental need to maintain a reputation for preserving confidential-
ity in the context of prepublication reviews of insiders' writings and in
intelligence gathering. 139
As in England, federal governmental employees who have access to
classified information must sign secrecy agreements requiring them to
submit for prepublication review all writings relating to their employ-
ment.14 Relying in part on the government's need to maintain a reputa-
tion for keeping secrets, the Supreme Court upheld prepublication
reviews required by these secrecy agreements and bans on governmental
employees' publications during the time it takes the government to deter-
mine whether classified information has been disclosed. 141 The govern-
ment may prohibit the publication of any material not submitted for
review, but if submitted, the government may prohibit only publication
of classified information. 142 In an attempt to establish extensive govern-
138. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); THE PENTAGON
PAPERS AND THE CouRTS, supra note 127, at 75-87.
139. CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3,
511, 513 n.8 (1980) (per curiam). See The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v.
United States, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
140. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. Persons with access to sensitive classified information
must sign similar secrecy agreements. Persons with access to classified information must sign
nondisclosure agreements that do not provide for pre-publication review. Presidential Direc-
tive on Safeguarding National Security Information, Dep't of Justice release (Mar. 11, 1983).
The wording of the agreement complies with Snepp, see infra notes 141-42 and accompanying
text. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1983, at Al, col. 4. Several agencies other than the CIA
require similar secrecy agreements. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 10.735-303(b) (1985) (Department of
State); and 28 C.F.R. § 45, 735-12(c) (1985) (Department of Justice).
141. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3. The Court did not address the FirstAmendment implica-
tions of prepublication clearance requirements. The dissent, however, asserted that the review-
ing agency could misuse its authority to delay publication or to modify the contents of writings
critical of the government. Id. at 526. Accordingly, prepublication review could go beyond
legitimate secrecy demands and inhibit free speech. Id. at 526 n.17.
142. In Snepp, the government conceded that Snepp's book divulged no classified informa-
tion, thus distinguishing the case from United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir,
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). Moreover, the government acknowledged a right to
publish unclassified information. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511. What the government claimed, and
the Supreme Court approved, was a right to review former insider employees' writings prior to
publication to determine whether they compromised classified information. Id.
The government has no interest in ensuring that unclassified or public domain informa-
tion is not published. Id. at 513 n.8. Accord United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir.
1945) (L. Hand) (the espionage statutes cannot be used to punish the dissemination of informa.
tion from "sources that were lawfully accessible to anyone who was willing to take the pains to
find, sift and collate it"); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975). But see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.),
appeal dismissed as moot, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (district court issued preliminary in-
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mental censorship of former employees' writings, President Reagan is
seeking to expand the applicability and scope of prepublication clearance
reviews. 43 The proposed prepublication reviews would apply to the
writings of former employees who had access to sensitive or classified
information, if the published material implied any proscribed fact.
In the context of the government's intelligence gathering functions,
the government's need to maintain confidentiality has recently been given
greater weight than the public right to know. The Supreme Court held
that the government can withhold from the public unclassified informa-
tion pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, in part to protect the
government's appearance of confidentiality. 1" In so ruling, the Court
mandated judicial deference to the government's decision to withhold the
intelligence-related information from public disclosure, regardless of the
merits of that decision.'45
junction under Atomic Energy Act, enjoining publication of an article on the making of a
hydrogen bomb, which was derived from declassified and public domain information. Pending
appeal, the information was published elsewhere and the government withdrew its request for
an injunction).
The recent dispute over the Washington Post's report about the space shuttle's secret
mission highlights another attempt by the government to limit dissemination of information
that is already in the public domain. Ignoring admonitions by Air Force Brig. Gen. Richard
F. Abel not to speculate about the secret mission, the Washington Post published a report
about the mission. Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1984, at Al, col. 6. Defense Secretary Wein-
berger accused the newspaper of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Washington Post, Dec.
20, 1984, at Al, col. 1. The newspaper argued that the information in the article was already
public. Id. Brig. Gen. Abel conceded that the Post article contained little or no information
that was not in the public record. Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 1, & AI0, col. 1.
See also Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1984, at A15, col. 1.
143. See Abrams, supra note 125, at 22; D. DaMAC, supra note 98, at 18-25.
Although the government has not formally adopted a policy in this regard, security clear-
ance agreements are now routinely imposed on employees of many governmental departments.
The Reagan Administration has also sought to maintain stricter control over the release of
governmental information by curtailing information leaks. Specifically, the Administration
has increased the use of polygraph tests in leak investigations and to determine the "trustwor-
thiness, patriotism and integrity" of non-intelligence personnel who might have access to se-
cret information. Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1985, at Al, col. 4. See also Washington Post, Dec.
19, 1984, at A4, col. 5 (House Ethics Committee issued a subpoena for a reporter's notes in
investigating an embarrassing leak of its investigation of Geraldine Ferraro's compliance with
financial disclosure rules; after media outcry, the subcommittee abandoned the leak probe).
These efforts to control the release of governmental information represent attempts by the
United States government to exercise the broad powers conferred on the British government
by the Official Secrets Act.
144. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1886-90. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, Sims
and Wolfe sought the grant proposals and contracts and names of individuals and institutions
that performed research as part of a large CIA project on controlling human behavior through
biological, chemical, and radiological means.
145. Id. at 1886-90. Because the National Security Act of 1947 makes the Director of
Central Intelligence responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unau-
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Despite increasing judicial deference to the government's claims of
national security and confidentiality, the legally enforceable right of ac-
cess to governmental records under the Freedom of Information Act
stands in sharp contrast to the English Thirty-Year Rule.146 The United
States statutory right protects the public from overzealous public offi-
cials, while the English rule protects officials from embarrassment and
criticism.
The recognized justifications for withholding information from the
public are broader in the English system than in the United States sys-
tem. The additional criteria accepted under English law tend to be those
that enable the government to protect itself from the dissemination of
information that can foment criticism. The Official Secrets Act prohibits
the unauthorized communication and possession of any information ob-
tained through governmental employment or contacts. 147 Accordingly,
the Official Secrets Act reaches beyond classified information and is not
limited to information related to important national interests. Through
the system of "D" Notices, the English government can determine what
information will be made available to the public. The Thirty-Year Rule
and the principle of collective cabinet responsibility likewise forestall
public access to information pertaining not only to security but also to
governmental policies and actions.
Although the United States classification system legitimately applies
only to information related to national security and foreign policy, it al-
lows the executive sufficient latitude to manipulate the classification of
information for purposes other than national security. Extensive prepub-
lication reviews of the writings of former governmental officials can pre-
vent timely public discussion of important issues in much the same way
as the Thirty-Year Rule, although for a shorter period of time. More-
thorized disclosure, see 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3), the Court held that the Director has wide-rang-
ing discretion to withhold information to protect an entity or individual that provides, or is
engaged to provide, information necessary for the CIA to carry out its statutory obligations.
Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1889-90. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Freedom of Information Act's cxemp-
tion for material specifically exempted from disclosure by statute). In reaching this decision,
the Court ignored the Freedom of Information Act's emphasis on judicial determinations of
whether material is exempt from disclosure. Moreover, the Court's decision allows the CIA to
prevent disclosure of unclassified information, Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1895 n.3 (Marshall, I., con-
curring), and information already in the public domain. Id. at 4458.
146. See P. HEWITr, THE ABUSE OF POWER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED KING-
DOM 87 (1982) for a comparison of the Freedom of Information Act with public access to
information in the United Kingdom.
147. The employees need not have had access to classified information and non-employees
are covered by the Act. Under the recent decision in United States v. Morison, supra note 120-
21 and accompanying text, the United States espionage statutes may have a similarly pervasive
reach.
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over, the Reagan Administration's recent attempts to expand prepublica-
tion reviews of former employees' writings beyond classified information
parallel the scope of the Official Secrets Act.
In England and the United States, the executive is accorded broad
discretion to act in the name of national security. In both systems the
executive can use the rubric of national security to restrict public access
to governmental information in an effort to limit criticism of
governmenal actions. In this way, the executive can foreclose public ac-
cess to information despite other protections accorded access rights
under the legal system. For example, the Reagan Administration's limi-
tations on press coverage of the invasion of Grenada illustrate a govern-
mental restriction of public access to information to stem public criticism
of governmental activities. 14 8 Similarly, Prime Minister Thatcher with-
held pertinent information about an order to sink a battleship in the Fal-
klands War.149 By disallowing independent press coverage of military
operations until after the events had occurred, both governments were
able to limit and shape the media presentation of their actions to the
public.
Until recently, the most striking difference in the ability of English
and United States governments to restrict public access to information
lay in the punishments meted out for unauthorized disclosures. Under
the Official Secrets Act the English government could prosecute and im-
prison those who leaked governmental information. For most of United
States history the government did not attempt, nor did courts recognize
its power to impose criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of
governmental information to the press. Now that the current adminis-
tration has succeeded in obtaining a criminal connection for an unau-
thorized disclosure, the power of the United States executive to control
access to governmental information more closely approximates that of
the English under the Official Secrets Act.
148. See An Off-the-Record War. The Pentagon's Restrictions Prove a Powverful Jeapon in
the Campaign for Public Support of the Invasion, Newsweek, Nov. 7, 1983, at 83; D. DEMAC,
supra note 98, at 98-101. For other examples of recent attempts to restrict public access to
governmental information, see supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
149. Milwaukee Journal, Aug. 20, 1984, pt. I at 2; see also supra notes 105-08 and accom-
panying text; C. PONTING, supra note 105. See generally R. HARRIS, GoTcHA! THE MEDIA,
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS (1983).
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IV. LIMITING PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
ABOUT THE JUDICIAL PROCESS-A THREAT
TO DEMOCRACY?
Since the Magna Carta, an open judicial process has been a recog-
nized check on governmental abuses. More than most other governmen-
tal functions, the administration of justice illustrates the impact of
societal values on individual rights. Secrecy in trials can mask the ways
that a government imperils individual rights.
In England, the administration of justice has been removed from
public scrutiny by a bar on dissemination of information disclosed in the
judicial process. In contrast, access to information about judicial pro-
ceedings is guaranteed in the United States as a right of self-
government. 150
A. Limiting Trial Publicity to Protect Fair Trial Rights
In the clash between the public's right to information and the right
of an accused to an impartial trial based solely on the facts presented at
trial, the English legal system favors fair trial rights while the American
system protects the public's right to know. 5' To ensure a fair trial, Eng-
lish courts use the contempt power to suppress trial publicity and public
debate during the pendency of a trial. The contempt power is not simi-
larly available in the United States.
1. English Law
In England, the contempt power has been used to punish acts and
published writings that are calculated to obstruct or interfere with the
administration of justice. 52  English common law generally prohibits
150. The negative effects of trial publicity, such as infringements on litigants' privacy
rights, are beyond the scope of this article.
151. See Rex v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432, 437; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 148. See also
D. SCHMEISER, supra note 63, at 222-23 (English and Canadian courts are far more solicitous
of fair trial rights than their American counterparts which favor free press rights).
152. Attorney General v. Times Newspapers, 1974 A.C. 273. See also Onslow's & What-
ley's Case, [1873] 9 Q.B. 219 and Skipworth's Case, [1873] 9 Q.B. 230 (statements at public
meetings that an accused person facing a second indictment had been denied due process and
had been a victim of perjury and injustice held to be contemptuous and subject to fines and
imprisonment); Rex v. Editor & Printers & Publishers of the "Evening Standard," 40 T.L.R.
833 (K.B. 1924) (in Crumple's Murder Case, a newspaper published reports of its investigation
at the scene of the crime, including witnesses' statements, for which it was fined £1000 and
costs); see also Rex v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 K.B. 845 (contempt conviction of editor for
publishing photograph of an accused person before it was certain identity was not an issue);
Rex v. Astor, 30 T.L.R. 10 (K.B. 1913) (contempt of court to publish together information
about civil and criminal proceedings relating to the same transaction because jury might be
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comment on the merits while a case is sub judice; that is, under judicial
consideration or otherwise undetermined by a court.153 In St. James's
Evening Post Case: Roach v. Garvan,154 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke de-
scribed the rationale behind this rule:
Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice, than to preserve
their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there any thing of
more pernicious consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the pub-
lick against persons concerned as parties in causes, before the cause is
finally heard... . There cannot be any thing of greater consequence,
than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may
proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.
1 55
This sub judice rule applies in both civil and criminal cases,
although it is more restrictive as applied to criminal matters.1 56 While
recognizing newspapers' rights to publish accurate reports of public
informed of civil matter which was not its concern); Rex v. Clarke, 103 T.LR. 636 (K.B.
1910) (newspaper editor fined £200 and costs for publishing a report that an individual who
fled to Canada and was arrested there confessed to the crime). It is not necessary to show that
prejudice has resulted; all that is necessary is that the information has a tendency to interfere
with a fair trial. Rex v. Tibbits & Windust, [1902] 1 K.B. 77, accord Goodhart, supra note 31,
at 899-90. See generally H. STREET, supra note 17, at 148-61.
153. E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 55, at 511-12. The right to publish information
about a case depends on whether a final decision has been rendered and on whether a new trial
is a certainty. Goodhart, supra note 31, at 894; H. STREET, supra note 17, at 156-57. Before
the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, it was impermissible to publish claims or defenses in
pending civil litigation. Chesshire v. Strauss, 12 T.L.R. 291 (Q.B.D. 1896); accord Granger v.
Brydon-Jack, [1918] 25 B.C. 526, 528 (Canadian law).
This common-law rule has been relaxed by the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, see S.A.
DE SMrrH, supra note 13, at 655-56. This Act was enacted to correct what the European
Court of Human Rights found to be excessive restrictions on press comment. Sunday Times v.
United Kingdom, [1980] 2 E.C.H.R. 245 (European Court of Human Rights), see infra note
156. The ban on press comment now applies only to publications that create a risk that the
course of justice will be impeded or prejudiced. Moreover, the ban does not begin until arrest
in criminal cases and until a hearing is scheduled in civil cases. It still persists through all
appeals. A court may order more pervasive restrictions when it deems them necessary. Given
the general distrust of press commentary, such restrictions are likely. See H. STREET, supra
note 17, at 167-69.
154. [1742] 2 Atkyn's 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 683.
155. Id. at 471, 26 Eng. Rep. at 685.
156. Seymour-Ure, supra note 113, at 162. For example, the Contempt of Court Act of
1981 begins the ban on press comment at a much earlier stage in criminal, as opposed to civil
matters. See supra note 153. The Sunday Times could not publish the scenario of the
thalidomide drug tragedy for seventeen years while cases on the subject were pending in the
courts. The English courts enjoined the Sunday Times from publishing an article criticizing a
settlement amount as being too small. The European Court of Human Rights held that the
injunction interfered with the newspaper's freedom of expression secured under Art. 10 and
was neither justified nor necessary under Art. 10(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, [1979] 12 E.C.H.R. 245 (European Court of
Human Rights). For a discussion of the case, see Abernathy, Should the United Kingdom
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court proceedings, English courts have admonished that "it is [the news-
papers'] duty to confine themselves to that, and they have no right to
publish comments or publish anything which does not actually oc-
cur." 157 Because they generally are limited to reporting court proceed-
ings, English newspapers may not publish the results of independent
investigations of matters under judicial consideration." 8 After all rights
of appeal have elapsed, the press may criticize the parties, the acts of
judges, and the overall administration of justice, provided such criticism
neither imputes improper motives to jurors and judges nor attempts to
impair the administration of justice.' 9
Under recent modifications of this contempt power, media discus-
Adopt a Bill of Rights?, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 431 (1983). See also § 11 of the Contempt of
Court Act of 1981 and Miller, The Contempt of Court Act, 1982 CRiM L. REv. 71.
157. Hatfield v. Healy, [1911] 18 W.L.R. 512, 516 (Harvey, C.J.). For example, newspa-
pers have been punished for contempt for publishing information derived from preliminary
hearings that was not admissible at trial on the grounds that such publication was prejudicial
to the defendants. See Rex v. Tibbits & Windust, [1902] 1 K.B. 77.
158. The law of contempt of court can prevent newspapers from assisting in criminal inves-
tigations. Because the press may not publish anything prejudicial to a suspect of a crime,
newspapers may not publish photographs of the accused or soon-to-be accused or other infor-
mation that may induce members of the public to provide useful information to police. The
law of contempt stands in the way of press interviews of witnesses and suspects, assistance in
detection and investigation of crime, and most other methods by which the media can assist
law enforcement officers in crime investigation. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 149-61. Accord
Rex v. Editor & Printers & Publishers of the "Evening Standard," [1924] 40 T.L.R. 833 (a
newspaper may not conduct and publish the results of an independent criminal investigation of
a person charged with a crime).
Editors and publishers of newspapers have been convicted of contempt for publishing
material before the suspect was arrested. See, e.g., Regina v. Odham's Press, Ltd., [1956] 3 All
E.R. 494 (editors of an article on vice and prostitution that attacked an individual were con-
temptuous even though the editors did not know the person had recently been charged with
keeping a brothel); Rex v. Davis, [1906] 1 K.B. 32 (editor of newspaper fined for publishing an
article about a woman arrested for abandoning a child even though the article was published
one month before she was charged with the crime); Rex v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432 (articles
depicting a man's character were contemptuous once he was later charged with a crime); Rex
v. Clement, [1821] 4 Barn. & Aid. 218, 106 Eng. Rep. 918 (newspapers cannot publish infor-
mation about trial until indictments of codefendants are judicially resolved).
Under the Administration of Justice Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, § 11, 7 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES 718-23 (3d ed. 1969), lack of knowledge in the exercise of reasonable care is
now a defense to a contempt charge even though the crime of contempt is still recognized
when proceedings are imminent but not yet pending. Under the Contempt of Court Act of
1981, lack of knowledge is a defense, but only insofar as it relates to knowledge that a proceed-
ing is pending.
159. See Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad & Tobago, 1936 A.C. 322, 335 (Privy
Council overturned contempt conviction for publishing article that criticized unequal criminal
sentences).
Press comment is limited in another way under the Contempt of Court Act. It is a con-
tempt of court to obtain or disclose the details of jury deliberations or any other information
from jurors about the proceedings.
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sion of pending cases may be more readily permitted provided it does not
give an opinion on the merits or does not otherwise prejudice pending
proceedings. 16 Nonetheless, it has been charged that the government
has recently commenced or prolonged judicial actions to prevent public
discussion of the underlying issues.
161
2. United States Law
In the United States, the courts give more credence to the public's
right to information about pending trials than to the effect publicity may
have on the fairness of the trial.1 62 Although the contempt powers of
United States courts are derived from the English common law, the
power to punish out-of-court publications that purportedly threaten the
fair administration of justice is constrained by the public right of access
to judicial information.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the federal courts to "punish
by fine or imprisonment at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of
authority in any case or hearing before the same."' 63 This broad authori-
zation was viewed as the equivalent of the English judicial power to pun-
ish contempt summarily. 16 Judges exercised this discretion without
restraint. For example, one judge used the contempt power to punish a
lawyer who published a critique of the judge's decision.' 65 This dispute
ultimately led to the enactment of a more restrictive contempt statute,
which empowered the courts to punish contempt, "[provided, that such
power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases
except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto
160. See Contempt of Court Act of 1981, supra notes 153, 156 & 158-59.
161. See, eg., Robinson, Bad News from Britain, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1985, at 65-66
(when Director of Public Prosecutions commenced an investigation into the discharge of radi-
oactive waste into the Irish Sea, media coverage and public debate about the issue lessened
because of the catastrophic fines for violating the sub judice rule). This contempt power has
been applied to prevent parliamentary discussion of matters pending in the courts. For exam-
ple, in one extreme instance, the contempt power was invoked by the Lord Chancellor to
prevent discussion of a case in which the jury had returned a verdict of not guilty even though
it is not possible to appeal a not guilty verdict. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 160-61.
162. The English tend to view the free reign given to the American press as violative of the
accused person's fair trial rights. H. STREET, supra note 17, at 148. But see Scarman, Human
Rights The Current Situation, in Do WE NEED A BiLL OF RiGHTs? 6 (C. Campbell ed. 1980).
163. Ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
164. E. HUDON, supra note 4, at 97.
165. I d; See J. GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 1931-1947, at 29 (1948).
For a discussion of the dispute underlying this publication and the subsequent legislative en-
actment, see Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L REv.
401, 423-31 (1928), and R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at 18-19.
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as to obstruct the administration of justice." 166 In 1918, the Supreme
Court interpreted the terms "presence" and "near" as causal; that is, a
court could apply the contempt power to an out-of-court statement only
if it caused an obstruction to the administration of justice.1 67 Subse-
quently, in 1941, the Supreme Court overturned this causal rule and read
the words "presence" and "near" to imply geographic rather than causal
requirements. 168 This decision marked the first judicial rejection of the
expansive contempt powers of the English common law.
During the 1940's, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases established the
constitutional parameters of judicial power to punish contempt by publi-
cation. In Bridges v. California169 the Court applied the clear and pres-
ent danger test as the measure against which these limitations on free
press should be judged, and stated that "the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished." 170 Under this test, the Court found no jus-
tification for the restrictions on free press, concluding that the possible
effect on the administration of justice was negligible, notwithstanding the
pendency of the cases. 71 Soon after Bridges, the Supreme Court decided
two other cases involving strongly worded criticisms of judges in pending
nonjury cases. 172 In reversing summary contempt convictions, the
Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test, declaring that
"freedom of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible ten-
dency to influence pending cases."' 73 As the test stands today, a serious
166. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 645, § 401, 62 Stat. 701. Before the Civil War, 23 of the then
33 states adopted similarly limited contempt power statutes. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 56, at
19. With the coming of the Civil War, however, judges reverted back to broader applications
of the contempt power to silence criticism. See, e.g., State of Arkansas v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384
(1855).
167. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) (Court upheld summary
contempt conviction for extra-judicial publication of articles intimating a judge's bias in favor
of one party); accord Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See Nelles & King, supra
note 165, for a history and survey of the law regarding contempt by publication in the United
States.
168. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) (Court held that court's contempt power
could not reach a person 100 miles from the courthouse who was trying to induce a plaintiff to
withdraw a pending lawsuit and rejected the Toledo Newspaper rule as a historic inaccuracy).
169. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
170. Id. at 263. See discussion of the clear and present danger test supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
171. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 252, 271-73.
172. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)(two editors held in contempt for asserting
that local judges had used technicalities excessively to free criminals) and Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1947)(media criticized judge's refusal to accept a jury verdict until jury changed its
position).
173. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 347.
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degree of harm to the administration of justice is necessary to justify the
exercise of the contempt power. 7 4 Since the Bridges decision in 1941, the
Supreme Court has not upheld a single factual predicate for the use of
the contempt power to punish the publication of information about pend-
ing matters.
It is also unlikely that Congress or a state could constitutionally
enact a criminal statute to punish disclosure of information about pend-
ing proceedings. In deciding a challenge to one such statute, the
Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test. The Court fol-
lowed its rulings in the contempt cases and held that out-of-court com-
mentary does not constitute a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice. 175
In jury trials, United States courts have tended to give more weight
to fair trial rights, but, at least over the course of the last decade, they
have been reluctant to limit pretrial and trial publicity. Instead of resort-
ing to the contempt power to limit publicity, courts generally rely on
curative procedural devices, such as voir dire, change of venue, continu-
ances, and jury instructions to eradicate the effect of prejudicial pretrial
publicity.176 Not long ago, however, in a case of pervasive and prejudi-
cial trial publicity, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due
process grounds, concluding that the defendant did not receive a fair
trial.177 Since that case, the balance has generally been struck in favor of
publicity.
In summary, English courts use the contempt power extensively to
punish publication of commentary on pending judicial matters. Newspa-
pers are restricted to publishing fair and accurate reports of ongoing judi-
cial proceedings. In contrast, United States newspapers can publish
virtually all information in the public domain during the pendency of a
case. Moreover, United States newspapers are not limited to information
in the public domain, but may publish confidential information that is
174. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338
U.S. 912 (1950) (per curiam).
175. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). See also Worrell
Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion,
105 S. Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed. 2d 309 (1985) (statute that punishes by criminal contempt person
who truthfully publishes name of individual against whom an indictment has been filed prior
to arrest, violates Frst Amendment).
176. See, e'g., Application of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); and Application of National
Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980).
177. Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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obtained through routine reporting techniques and independent
investigations.
B. Public Scrutiny of the Judicial Process-Access to Judicial
Records and Products of Discovery
English and United States courts differ in the weight they accord the
public right of access to judicial records. Courts in these countries have
considered divergent factors to be of primary concern in evaluating
similiar public access issues.
Historically, the English common law recognized a right of access to
public records.'78 This right did not exist merely to satisfy individual
curiosity, but rather it accrued to individuals who had a direct interest in
a document and who sought inspection for a legitimate purpose.' 79 This
doctrine was further refined to require a showing of a proprietary interest
in the document or a need for the document as evidence in pending or
prospective litigation.'80 United States courts extended the right of ac-
cess to the public-at-large.' 8 ' An individual seeking access to a public
record did not have to show that he or she needed the document as evi-
dence in order to defend or maintain an action in court.' 2 As a right of
citizenship, every individual acquired a right to inspect and copy public
records. In extending this right to the public, one court stated, "If there
be any rule of the English common law that denies the right of access to
public records, it is repugnant to our democratic institutions. Ours is a
government of the people. Every citizen rules."'' 83 Over time, English
178. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 25-26 (1953).
179. Rex v. Justices of StafFordshire, 6 A & E 84, 96 (K.B. 1837); Rex v. Lucas, 10 East
235 (K.B. 1808); Rex v. Tower, 4 M & S 162 (K.B. 1815).
180. H. CROSS, supra note 178, at 25. See also Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co,,
117 F. 504, 506-07 (C.C.D. Colo. 1902). Cf In re McLean, 16 F. Cas. 237, 239 (C.C.S.D,
Ohio 1879) (No. 8,877). Nevertheless, a right of access to information regarding the expendi-
ture of public revenue was granted to every citizen. Rex v. Justices of Leicester, 4 B&C 891
(K.B. 1825).
181. See, eg., Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928). Accord Egan v.
Board of Water Supply of City of N.Y., 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); State ex rel. Terry
v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879).
182. Nowack, 243 Mich. at 201, 219 N.W. at 750 (an editor and publisher of a newspaper
granted permission to inspect public records pertaining to expenditures of public funds). See
also Ex Parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1915) (the right of an individual to examine
judicial records does not depend upon his or her interest in the documents).
183. Nowack, 243 Mich., at 201, 219 N.W. at 749-50. Like English courts, some American
courts have held that government agencies may regulate the public right of access both to
safeguard individual privacy, see, e.g., In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893); and to
protect administrative efficiency, see, eg., Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265,
423 P.2d 193 (1967); State ex rel Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900).
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courts also redefined this right to inure to members of the public without
requiring a showing of a special interest in the document,
Under both English and United States common law, the right of
access to public records applies to judicial records.' 5 The public right of
access to judicial records derives from the openness of the Anglo-Ameri-
can judicial systems, the rationale being that access to judicial records
provides those who are unable to gain entry to a courtroom the same
opportunity to be informed about the proceedings as those present.1 86
From the rationale behind the public right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings, it would appear that the right of access to judicial records
should be coextensive with the openness of the proceedings. In other
words, the public should have the right to inspect and copy all judicial
records offered as evidence or discussed in open court. In practice, how-
ever, the public right of access to judicial records falls short of the open-
ness of the underlying proceedings.18 7 The extent to which this is true
and to which the right of access extends beyond that which is brought
out in open court define the breadth of the public right.
1. English Law
English courts have rejected the contention that once a document is
read in open court, every member of the public or the press has a right of
184. See Home Office v. Harman, [1982] 1 All E.R. 532, 537-38 (H.L); [1981] 2 All E.R.
349, 366 (C.A. and Q.B.).
185. See, ag., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); United
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 314-16 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 958-59
(C.C.P.A. 1957) (per curiam).
186. It is a settled principle in English law that "every Court of Justice is open to every
subject of the King." Scott v. Scott, 1913 A.C. 417, 440, [1911-1913] 1 All E.R. 1, 11, and that
"[p]ublicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all
guards against improvity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial." Haman,
[1982] 1 All E.R. at 537. The United States Supreme Court has evoked the same rationale for
freedom of the press: "A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration.... The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
The right to attend criminal trials is guaranteed by the first amendment, absent compel-
ling governmental countervailing interests. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596 (1982). Some courts have extended qualified first amendment protection of the public
right to attend trials to civil trials and to pretrial and post-trial proceedings. See, eg., Pub-
licker Industries v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trials); Press- Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (pretrial suppression hearings).
187. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), re'd sub nora.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). Some judicial records are not
open to public inspection, either because of statutory limitations or exercise of the trial judge's
discretion. H. CROSS, supra note 178, at 143-52.
19851
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
access to the document. 188 While a final adjudication of a matter is pend-
ing, prior to exhaustion of all avenues of appeal, public commentary
about the underlying issues and facts is curtailed by contempt of court
powers. 189 Moreover, an English judge has the power to prohibit accu-
rate reports of the proceedings, even those without commentary when
publication may infringe on an interest such as the right to a fair trial, 19
An English judge's discretion to limit dissemination of information about
judicial proceedings is untrammeled by public access concerns.' 91
There is a presumption under English law that documents read in
open court retain their confidentiality. The press may publish such confi-
dential documents only with the owner's consent or when the public in-
terest in disclosure outweighs the owner's interest in continuing
confidentiality. 92 Under English law, a party obtaining documents
through discovery impliedly agrees not to use the discovered materials
for collateral purposes. 193 A party is protected against an adversary's use
of discovered documents for purposes other than the action for which
they were discovered.' 94 In Home Office v. Harman,"5 the House of
Lords held that the implied obligation does not end once discovered doc-
uments are read in open court.
In Harman, a lawyer who represented a prisoner in an action dhal-
188. See Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 363; Harman, [1982] 1 All E.R. at 538.
189. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
190. See, eg., Rex v. Clement, [1821] 106 Eng. Rep. 918; see also Magistrates' Courts Act
of 1980, which made it unlawful to publish evidence presented in proceedings to determine
whether to commit an accused for trial until after trial and any other proceedings are
completed.
191. Under American law, closure of proceedings or sealing of evidence is limited by the
constitutionally protected public right of access. For example, in issuing a closure order, a
judge must determine that there is a substantial probability: 1) of irreparable damage to a fair
trial if certain evidence is not sealed; 2) that alternatives to closure will not protect the fair
trial right; and 3) that closure will be effective in preventing the perceived harm. Associated
Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983).
192. Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 349, 363-64. In England, documents that have been
publicly disclosed in open court retain their confidentiality despite the fact that a judge has
determined them to be admissible evidence.
193. Id. at 354. This customary implied agreement not to use discovery documents for
collateral purposes first surfaced in 1948. See Alterskye v. Scott, [1948] 1 All E.R. 469, Prior
to that time, it was within the judge's discretion to determine what could be done with discov-
ery papers. Eagles, Disclosure of Material Obtained on Discovery, 47 THE MOD. L. REV. 284,
285 (1984).
194. Riddick v. Thames Board Mills, [1977] 3 All E.R. 677. The implied agreement ap-
plies to material obtained by means of a subpoena duces tecum, see Sybron Corp. v. Barclay's
Bank, Chancery Division [1985], 1 Ch. [1984] 3 WLR 1055, and to information stored in the
mind, Eagles, supra note 193, at 302. Collateral purposes include future proceedings and the
ban persists even if the information is set out in a judgment in the initial proceedings. Id.
195. [1982] 1 All E.R. 532 (H.L.); [1981] 2 All E.R. 349 (C.A. and Q.B.).
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lenging a prison detention program sought to obtain documents pertain-
ing to the program. The Home Office objected to disclosure of the
documents on the ground of public interest immunity. The trial court
rejected the immunity argument and ordered the production of 6,800
pages of documents.1 96 At the Home Office's request, Ms. Harman, the
lawyer for the prisoner, expressly agreed that the "documents obtained
on discovery should not be used for any other purposes except for the
case in hand."' 197
At the trial, material parts of 800 pages of the documents were read
in open court. 198 A few days after the trial, Ms. Harman allowed a jour-
nalist access to portions of the documents disclosed in court. 199 The jour-
nalist published an article which was highly critical of the establishment
of the detention program by the Home Office.' ° Consequently, the trial
court found Ms. Harman guilty of contempt of court for breaching the
duty, both implied by law and confirmed by her express promise, not to
use documents obtained in discovery for collateral purposes.", Both the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords dismissed the subsequent ap-
peals.2"2 The House of Lords emphasized the integrity and limited func-
196. The Home Office objected to the production of several of the documents on the
ground of public interest immunity. After a hearing and judicial inspection of the documents,
the judge ordered production of the documents. Williams v. Home Office, [1981] 1 All E.R.
1151. For a description of the public interest immunity doctrine see supra text accompanying
notes 83-85.
Discovery under English law is more limited than in the United States. In England, dis-
covery generally is limited to the exchange of documents relevant to the issues in a case and
excludes oral depositions, physical and mental examinations, and discovery from nonparties.
J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN DISCOVERY
LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 8-11 (1982). See Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 359.
197. Letter from Harriet Harman to the Treasury Solicitor (Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in
Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 352.
198. Williams v. Home Office (No. 2), [1981] 1 All E.R. 1211. The documents provided
details of high level policymaking regarding the establishment of the experimental control unit.
Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 362.
199. The journalist told Ms. Harman that he was writing a feature article about some of
the issues raised at trial. Since he had been absent from some of the proceedings, he requested
the opportunity to inspect the documents that had been read in open court. The requested
documents included those that had been the subject of the Home Office's public interest immu-
nity challenge. Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. at 353-54.
200. Id. at 361-62.
201. Id. at 358.
202. Harman, [1982] 1 All E.R. 532 (H.L.); Harman, [1981] 2 All E.R. 358 (C.A.). Dis-
missing an appeal in the English courts is the functional equivalent of affirming the lower
court's decision in American courts. The Court of Appeal rejected Ms. Harman's contention
that once documents are read in open court, they become part of the public domain, holding
that the press cannot publish such documents without the owner's consent. Harman, [1981] 2
All E.R. at 363-64.
[i]t was in the public interest that these documents should be kept confidential. They
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tion of the discovery process and valued the primacy of privacy rights in
documents subject to discovery over a right to impart or receive
information.2"3
The juxtapositioning of the right to publish information based on
documents read in open court with the implied obligation not to disclose
discovered documents for collateral purposes leads to what one jurist
called "the guilty left hand-innocent right hand anomaly." Theoreti-
cally, Ms. Harman could have shown a reporter a transcript of the hear-
ing including portions of the documents read in open court. Because she
showed the reporter the actual documents, however, her actions consti-
tuted a contempt of court. °4 Lord Diplock minimized the importance of
this postulated anomaly in two ways. First, obtaining a transcript of a
proceeding involves great expense and is a long and arduous task.20 If an
attorney embarks on this journey and obtains a transcript, presumably
this expenditure of time and money was undertaken in some capacity
other than the legal representative of the client in the litigation.2"6 Thus,
the sacrosanct implied obligation would not be violated. Second, Lord
Diplock cautioned judges not to allow sensitive documents to be read
aloud in court.20 7 Instead, if the admissibility of a document has been
contested, albeit unsuccessfully, the judge should read the document in
advance of the trial or silently in court.208
Public access to judicial proceedings in England allows the public to
attend trials and to publish reports of the proceedings from their own
notes or any available transcripts. Where fair trial rights are implicated,
should not be exposed to the ravages of outsiders. I regard the use made by the
journalist in the case of these documents to be highly detrimental to the good order-
ing of our society. They were used so as to launch a wholly unjustified attack on
Ministers of State and high civil servants, who were only doing their very best to deal
with a wicked criminal who had harassed society ....
Id. at 364.
203. Harman, [1982] 1 All E.R. at 534, 536. Several jurists articulated a fear that allowing
public disclosure of discovered documents after they have been read in court could create an
incentive for noncompliance with discovery.
204. Id. at 538.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 539. Lord Roskill found availability of information conditioned on whether a
document was read in open court (as opposed to out-of-court or silent readings by the judge)
largely a matter of chance and difficult to justify. Id. at 552-53.
208. Id. Ms. Harman has appealed the House of Lords' determination to the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. A confidential, provisional decision has been rendered
and final settlement negotiations are underway. Discussion with A. Lester, Q.C., barrister for
Ms. Harman (Oct. 2, 1985). For an analysis of the Harman case under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, see Eagles, supra note 193, at 288-89.
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however, publicity is curtailed. Similarly, an initial owner's privacy right
in documents subject to discovery supersedes any public right of access
to the material even when it is already in the public domain. Thus, the
public right of access to judicial records under English law does not cor-
respond to the openness of the underlying proceedings.
2. United States Presumption of Public Access
to Judicial Records
In contrast to the English courts' concern with fair trial rights and
the property rights of the party from whom discovered material is ob-
tained, United States courts have created a strong presumption in favor
of public access to judicial records:
Once the evidence has become known to the members of the public,
including representatives of the press, through their attendance at a
public session of court, it would take the most extraordinary circum-
stances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically
in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence. . . .2
The privilege to disseminate information disclosed in public judicial pro-
ceedings is arguably absolute.21 0 A court cannot prohibit truthful report-
ing of evidence adduced at an open hearing.21' Moreover, states cannot
impose civil or criminal sanctions on the accurate dissemination of infor-
mation disclosed in public court documents.21 2
In contrast, the presumptive right to inspect and copy judicial
records is not absolute. It does not attach to all records used in the judi-
cial process, and it can be overcome by countervailing factors.21 3 As a
general rule, the presumption arises once evidence is offered or admitted
209. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980). Some courts have ascribed
constitutional dimensions to this presumption. See Associated Press v. District Court, 705
F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (7th Cir.
1982).
210. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Oklahoma Publishing Co.
v. District Court, 430 U.S. 309 (1977) (per curiam); Barnett, Th:e Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29
STAN. L. REv. 539, 546 (1977); Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGs
CoNsT. L. Q. 107, 118 (Winter 1977).
211. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976).
212. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox, the Court invalidated
a statutory ban on broadcasting rape victims' names that applied even when the information
was obtained from public records.
213. The common-law right to inspect and copy public records originally permitted copy-
ing of the content of written documents. With the advent of technology, the right has been
extended to include copying the physical embodiment of the document. See United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Indus-
trial Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 898-99 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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in open court or is used in the adjudicative stages of litigation.214 It gen-
erally does not attach to evidence entered under seal, assuming there is a
valid reason for the seal, because the session of court is not open with
respect to that item of evidence.2 The presumption may apply, how-
ever, to sealed information that is critical to a judicial matter of public
interest, even though such information has not entered the public
domain.21 6
Even when the presumption of public access applies, it may be over-
come by countervailing factors, such as privacy interests and the right to
a fair trial. Except when the public or the media demand the right to
copy taped exhibits in addition to the right to inspect and publicize their
contents, courts have uniformly attached greater weight to the public
right of access than to conflicting rights. Thus, to prevent public access,
courts generally must keep information out of the public domain by seal-
ing items of evidence or by otherwise avoiding public disclosure.217 In
some instances, however, courts will not allow the media to copy and
broadcast evidence in order to protect the privacy rights of third
parties.21s
214. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978); United States V.
Alberico, 640 F.2d 1315, 1320 n.15 (10th Cir. 1980).
215. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts may seal cvi-
dence to protect trade secrets, see Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968); to protect
national security interests, see International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir.
1963); and to avoid hampering law enforcement efforts, see United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d
825, 831 (10th Cir. 1981); but see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d
1165 (6th Cir. 1983) (lifting seal where court found no valid reason to keep information from
the public).
216. See, eg., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir.
1984); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559 (1985). Sealed
evidence may be unsealed depending on many factors, including the need for public access. Cf
United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (privacy interests must be considered
in decisions to unseal documents used to show search was overbroad); In re Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, slip op. No. 82-1820 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 1985), petition for reh. en
bancpending (court upheld against first amendment challenge delay in unsealing exhibits used
in Tavoularea libel trial until after final judgment).
217. If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the courts must
respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975). See Hubbard v. Journal Pub-
lishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962) (newspaper article implicitly identifying rape
victim allowed because based on public court records). See, e.g., In re Gannett News Service,
12 Media L. Rptr. 1113 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 1985) (court sealed material to preserve fair trial
rights of Louisiana Governor Edwards).
218. United States v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden,
648 F.2d 814, 829 (3d Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Application of KSTP Television, United States V.
Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980) (court refused to release videotapes of
events leading up to a repeated rape because it would expose the victim to public humiliation);
Application of ABC, Inc., Cable News Network, Inc., CBS, Inc., & NBC, Inc., 537 F. Supp.
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Public access to taped evidence also may be tempered by the court's
duty to assure the accused a fair and reliable determination of guilt or
innocence based only on evidence presented in open court.219 In recent
cases, television networks have sought to transmit taped evidence to the
public, arguing that showing a vidoetape conveys more complete infor-
mation to the public than recitation of a transcript.2" In evaluating these
claims, courts have been unpersuaded by arguments based on the fair
trial rights of the defendant."1 In some instances, courts have disallowed
broadcasts to protect the fair trial rights of third parties.tm Generally,
however, if the tape was shown as evidence to the jury in open court in a
criminal trial of public interest, courts are apt to rely on voir dire, change
of venue, and continuances to cure prejudice resulting from the
broadcast.223
The right to disseminate information extends beyond public court
1168, 1172 (D.D.C. 1982) (court denied media the right to broadcast videotape of Jodie Fos-
ter's testimony played at John Hinckley's hearing because of safety considerations).
219. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966). Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1956) (Warren, CJ., concurring); Patterson v. Colorado ex. rel Attorney General, 205 U.S.
454 (1907). The accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is balanced against the public
interest in knowing what transpires in the courtroom. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945,
951 (2d Cir. 1980).
220. In the course of the ABSCAM trials, broadcast journalists sought permission to copy
and broadcast the tapes admitted into evidence. See United States v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609
(D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) on appeal after remand,
681 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982); and United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980). See also
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
221. Myers, 635 F.2d at 953 (court relied on jury instructions directing jurors to avoid
publicity about the trial). Accord Associated Press v. District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.
1983); United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1979) (broadcast did not interfere
with defendant's fair trial rights because the defendant relied on an entrapment defense,
thereby admitting that the events occurred); In re Application of CBS, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 769
(N.D. Il1. 1982) (court allowed copying of tapes because defendant had pleaded guilty and
been sentenced, and prejudice to fair trial rights of those yet-to-be-tried was speculative).
222. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982) (possibility of future trials
supported denial of access); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981)
(the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to permit broadcast
copying of BRILAB tapes on the grounds that publication of the tapes would severely preju-
dice a yet-to-be-tried defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and would impair the
selection of a fair and impartial jury).
223. Criden, 648 U.S. at 814; Myers, 635 F.2d at 945 (court rejected the argument that
exposure to the tapes would prejudice the trials of other ABSCAM defendants on the grounds
that the public's awareness of the news was overestimated as shown by the fact that only half
those summoned for jury selection for this case had any knowledge of ABSCAM); United
States v. Mouzin, 559 F. Supp. 463, 468 (C.D.Cal. 1983) (the possibility of a retrial is too
remote and voir dire would be a sufficient safeguard against prejudice in the trial of a severed
defendant because only four of the sixty-six people questioned in empanelling the jury had
sufficient knowledge to warrant dismissal for cause despite widespread publicity shortly before
the trial). Accord Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 609.
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records. For example, even where evidence has been admitted under seal
or is otherwise not publicly disclosed, courts and legislatures cannot pun-
ish publication of information lawfully obtained through routine report-
ing techniques.224
3. Public Right of Access to Products of Discovery
In contrast to the English courts' concern with the property rights
of the party from whom discovered material is obtained, United States
law allows a party to use discovered material freely in the absence of a
protective order.225 Although the discovery rules place no limitations on
a party's use of discovered materials, Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows a court to impose such limitations, upon a show-
ing of good cause.2 26 Absent a protective order, a party may use discov-
ered materials for any purpose, including dissemination to the public. 227
United States courts have ascribed first amendment protections to
the right to disseminate information obtained through discovery. 228 The
Supreme Court has recognized the legitimate use of litigation as "a vehi-
224. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). States can restrict the
right to disseminate information contained in court records only for the most compelling state
interests and then only through the least restrictive means. See Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
225. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Certain discovery rules require that
responsive material be filed with the court, which becomes part of the public record. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (depositions), FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories), FED. R. Civ. P. 36
(requests for admissions). Rules pertaining to other discovered materials, for example requests
for documents, FED. R. Civ. P. 34, do not require filing of responsive materials with the court.
Accordingly, these discovery materials become part of the public record only if a party in-
troduces them into evidence or relies on them in a pleading. Once discovered materials be-
come part of the public record, the common-law right of access attaches; accordingly, the
public has the right to inspect and copy such materials in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances. A statutory presumption of openness of discovery materials derives from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, even if those materials are not used at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d)
& 26(c); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 567-68
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
226. A party may move for a protective order to limit the scope of discovery, the method of
disclosure, or the subsequent use of discovered material under FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c), The
person from whom discovery is sought must so move and must show good cause for the pro-
tective order to be issued. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c).
Protective orders are commonly sought to protect national security information, see Inter-
national Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1963); to preserve privileged informa-
tion, see Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976); and to maintain
trade secrets, see Natta v. Zletz, 405 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968).
227. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Tavoulareas v. Washington
Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir 1984), vacated and remanded, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (per curiam) (court of appeals did not allow dissemination of information
contained in depositions not used at trial because of privacy interests).
228. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 176, 188 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
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cle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of
communicating useful information to the public."' 9 In Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer,"0 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ac-
cepted the notion of litigation as a means of obtaining information to
disseminate to the public. In that case, an association of lawyers chal-
lenged the validity of disciplinary rules proscribing extra-judicial com-
ments by attorneys. The court stated,
[I]n our present society many important social issues become entan-
gled to some degree in civil litigation. Indeed, certain civil suits may
be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information for the pub-
lic .... Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for govern-
mental action or correction. Such revelations should not be kept from
the public. Yet it is normally only the attorney who will have this
knowledge or realize its significance .... [W]e should be extremely
skeptical about any rule that silences that voice. 3
1
In several recent cases, courts have evaluated the first amendment
rights of attorneys and parties to disclose information obtained through
discovery. Although some courts held that orders restraining attorneys
and parties from disclosing discovery materials were unlawful prior re-
straints, the Supreme Court closed the door to this prior restraint
protection.
In In re Halkin,32 the plaintiffs alleged that certain government
agencies had conducted unlawful surveillance of individuals who op-
posed the Vietnam War through lawful political activities. By means of
discovery, the plaintiffs obtained documents from the defendants pertain-
ing to operation CHAOS - the CIA's surveillance program of antiwar
activists.233 The defendants did not seek a protective order. After the
plaintiffs issued notice of their intent to release the documents to the
press, the defendants obtained an order restraining the parties and coun-
sel from publicly disclosing the documents and from making extra-judi-
cial statements about the information obtained through discovery.23- The
229. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978).
230. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
231. Id. at 258. In discussing the broad rights of attorneys and parties to disclose discov-
ered material, the court in In re Halkin observed that certain civil suits may be instigated to
invoke discovery as a means of obtaining information for the public. 598 F.2d at 187.
232. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
233. Id. at 180. The plaintiffs requested, under FED. R. Civ. P. 34, production of docu-
ments relating to Operation CHAOS. The defendants responded by producing the requested
documents purged of all material that the government asserted would impair the United
States' foreign relations, reveal CIA intelligence sources and methods, or implicate third par-
ties' privacy interests.
234. Id. at 179-81. The restraining order issued by the district court did not forbid the
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court of appeals held that the restraining order violated the first amend-
ment by prohibiting political expression without a clearly articulated, le-
gitimate justification.235
In In re San Juan Star Company,236 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit upheld a protective order that prohibited attorneys from
disclosing information obtained during a trial about the killing of two
Puerto Rican independentistas. The court held that the protective order
did not violate the first amendment according to the following four fac-
tors: 1) the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm of disclo-
sure; 2) the effectiveness of the protective order in preventing the harm;
3) the availability of less restrictive alternatives; and 4) the reach of the
protective order to ensure that it is narrowly drawn to prevent only the
perceived harm.237
The practice of limiting public access to the products of discovery
by means of more restrictive and far-reaching protective orders recently
passed constitutional scrutiny. In Seattle Times Company v.
Rhinehart,238 the leader of a fanatical religious group sued several news-
papers and reporters for libelous statements contained in articles pub-
lished about the religious group. The defendants initiated extensive
discovery, seeking financial information, a list of members, and the iden-
tities of the group's donors over the preceding ten years. Because the
defendants intended to use the information obtained through discovery
in future articles about the leader and his group, the plaintiffs refused to
disclose the information and sought a protective order. The trial court
issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the
discovery process pertaining to donors' and members' identities and to
the financial affairs of the group's leaders. The Supreme Court rejected
the tests applied by the courts of appeal in Halkin and San Juan Star
publication of information of public record or of information acquired outside the court's
processess.
235. Id. at 197. The court identified three constitutional restrictions on protective orders
that restrain expression: (1) the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious;
(2) the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and (3) there must be no alter-
native means of protecting the public interest which would be less intrusive on expression. Id.
at 191. In Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court applied the
three-part test set forth in Halkin and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by
issuing an overbroad protective order when less restrictive means of serving the legitimate
interest were available.
236. 662 F.2d 108 (Ist Cir. 1981) (a protective order prohibited the plaintiffs' attorneys
from disclosing to the press information obtained through depositions).
237. Id. at 114-17.
238. 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). The rule governing protective orders construed by the
Supreme Court is the same as FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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concluding that they would impose an unwarranted restriction on the
trial court's duty to oversee the discovery process. 239 The Court recog-
nized that information obtained through civil discovery is protected by
the first amendment, but held that a litigant has no unrestrained right to
disseminate such information. 24 The Court identified only the following
three constraints on the issuance of protective orders: (1) the protective
order may be issued only on a showing of good cause as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c); (2) the protective order must be
limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery; and (3) the protective
order must not restrict the dissemination of information obtained from
other sources.241 The Court limited appellate review of the issuance of a
protective order to an abuse of discretion determination and thus limited
the extent to which the discovery process can be used to disseminate in-
formation to the public.242
Even after Seattle Times, use of discovered material in the United
States legal system is not limited to the particular action for which the
information is initially sought, unless the court issues a protective order.
Not only may civil litigation be used to obtain and disseminate informa-
tion, but some courts have been hesitant to restrain a lawyer's freedom to
disclose any discovery material publicly.243 The special role that United
States lawyers play in the dissemination of information obtained through
discovery contrasts with that of the silenced English solicitors. The
guilty left hand-innocent right hand dichotomy illustrates the limita-
tions on the solicitor's use of information obtained through discovery. In
some respects, the English solicitor is subjected to greater scrutiny with
regard to the dissemination of information than the general public, while
the United States lawyer is subjected to less scrutiny than the public by
some United States courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In any governmental system, those in power seek to limit public crit-
239. 104 S. Ct. at 2205.
240. Id. at 2206-07.
241. Id. at 2209. Accord International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir.
1963).
242. Seattle Times, 104 S. CL at 2207-10.
243. An express agreement not to disclose information obtained through discovery for pur-
poses unrelated to the action for which the information is obtained exists in American law.
See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 428
F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). However, judicial orders enforcing the agreements implicate
the public right of access to judicial records. See ORLIAC v. Berthe, 765 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1985); Sharijah Investment Co. v. P.C. Telemart, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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icism and public access to embarrassing information. Unchecked gov-
ernmental power could succeed to a large degree in punishing and
forestalling negative public opinion. Neither in England nor in the
United States does this sort of unlimited censorship exist.
When sovereignty resided in a monarch or in one specific branch of
government, public criticism of governmental actions could be punished
directly. The sovereign could punish political criticism directly through
seditious libel prosecutions and the exercise of the contempt power.
Moreover, because the public had no right to participate in the govern-
ment, there was no corresponding public right of access to governmental
information. The sovereign, as sovereign, could shape public opinion
about governmental affairs completely.
As democratic principles replaced the notions of infallible sover-
eignty and autocratic government, the public gained rights of direct par-
ticipation. Theoretically, because sovereignty resides in the people, the
law protects public access to information and public right to criticize the
government. In both England and the United States, this shift in political
theory led both to a steady expansion of the public's right to know about
governmental activities and to less direct suppression of public criticism.
Punishing citizens for opposing governmental actions conflicts with
democratic principles of public participation in government. Accord-
ingly, seditious libel prosecutions and certain exercises of the contempt
power have either fallen into disuse or have been sharply limited in scope
and availability. Similarly, claims of Crown or executive privilege have
become limited in scope and in subject matter by judicial oversight. In
place of direct governmental suppression of dissension, English and
United States governments now limit access to information as a more
discrete, and perhaps more palatable, means of suppressing opposition.
Governmental restrictions on public access to information also clash
with democratic principles. For that reason, the English and United
States systems recognize legitimate limitations on the public right of ac-
cess only when necessary to protect sensitive governmental functions. In
practice, however, these limitations have been greatly expanded in both
systems to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing or negative informa-
tion. For example, English and United States governments selectively
withhold information from the public by manipulating its classification
or by asserting a claim of executive privilege.
Most of the governmental functions removed from public scrutiny
involve national security, foreign affairs, or governmental decision-mak-
ing. In England, however, the judicial process is also shielded from pub-
lic discussion through a bar on publications about pending proceedings
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and limitations on public access to information disclosed in the judicial
process. In many respects, these restrictions remove an important gov-
ernmental function, the administration of justice, from the arena of effec-
tive popular self-government.
As manifested in established legal doctrine, the English system is
more restrictive of the public right of access to information than the
United States system. Nonetheless, many recent developments in the
United States demonstrate that governmental officials who desire to limit
access to negative or embarrassing information can do so within the ex-
isting system. In many respects, the recent expansions of governmental
power to suppress information in the United States approximate the air
of secrecy inherent in English legal doctrine.

